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This thesis involves the development of a methodology that when assessed 
hermeneutically, provides an existential yet accessible framework that informs 
and deepens the practice of improvised contemporary movement forms. This 
theoretical methodology’s construction also initiates a unique aesthetic theory that 
can be used for solidifying an improvisational creative process. The unveiling of 
concealed convergences eventually resonates with dancing bodies as the 
becoming of the unseen through a phenomenological grounding that performers 
using improvised movement structures have ostensibly disregarded as being the 
forgotten trance in dance. Through the interpolation of topics and concepts 
exclusive to the fields of political theory, aesthetics, philosophy and 
hermeneutics, selected segments from works by prominent thinkers from Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel through Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty are 
deconstructed to inform the eventual reasoning of how an emancipated dancing 
experience might come to exist.   
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In my creative work as part of my MFA thesis, I developed a method of emancipating the 
dancing body so that movement occurs independently and uniformly of itself with non-
dependence to kinesthetic connotations that derive from, inform and ultimately favour politically 
epistemic predispositions. These epistemic predispositions, including normative conditions such 
as the desirable role and behaviour that either a choreographer or dancer ought to embody, frame 
and confine a dancing body. These normative conditions may be held responsible for enabling 
creative distortion in movement examination (when contemplated, delivered and physicalized), 
thereby exacerbating the delicate and often vulnerable nature of both the dancing body and the 
idealized aesthetic of contemporary dance. By using hermeneutics to demystify certain textual 
works vivifying convergences in political theory and the art of contemporary dance as two 
interdependently and co-equivocal domains of knowledge, I developed a methodological process 
through the political and philosophical connections and convergences that emerge in order to 
create the possibility of emancipating the dancing bodies of my collaborators.  
As a dancing body already exists as a political entity when entering a performing space, I 
was challenged to examine how I could support dancers to become autonomous through the 
methodology that I developed as part of my creative process, which was informed by my 
understanding of what an emancipated transformation might feel, look and sound like, and 
investigated primarily using the following theorists and their selected works. It is vital to 
mention that the concomitance of these theorists creates the particular possibility of a “body 
phenomenology,” which when assessed using hermeneutics, can provide the emergence of an 
emancipating methodology exclusive to the practice of improvised contemporary dance. As 





value of syntactical resemblances conditioned through the distilled body-thought connections 
derived from Heideggerian existentialist ideologies, further reflected through each of these 
theorists as being Heidegger’s disciples. Interestingly, these syntactical resemblances emulate a 
similar yet revitalized deterministic phenomenological clause to reemerge though my 
hermeneutical analysis, as they may have been proposed in their original text. Specifically, 
Georg William Friedrich Hegel’s Introduction to Lectures on Aesthetics (1993), Alain Badiou’s 
Handbook of Inaesthetics (2005), Jacques Rancière’s Dissensus on Politics and Aesthetics 
(2010) and The Emancipated Spectator (2009), and Diana Taylor’s “Acts of Transfer” from The 
Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (2003) comprise the 
grounding of a theoretical methodological framework that supports the development of an 
eventual emancipated dancing body. Additional theorists whose publications support my 
research include Theodor W. Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1997) and The Jargon of Authenticity 
(1973) in addition to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (2012).  
This thesis has a quadripartite structure. Part I assesses the fundamentals of the politics 
of aesthetics in relation to the aforementioned theorists, specifically the relationship and capacity 
that such a domain carries over how the emancipation of a dancing body may eventually come to 
exist. Part I focuses on the dancing body and how the tyrannical role of the choreographer often 
impedes and limits individuality when mimetic principles (replication and representation through 
apprehension) are responsible for creating the basis of choreography. Part I emphasizes the role 
of the choreographer over the dancer, but will not entirely estrange the dancer’s role. Part II 
discusses the role of the dancer and how codified languages from colliding roles dissipate upon 
demystifying three somatically compatible terms used to create the condition of a dance. Part II 





German origins as identified in Heideggerian philosophy and examines how a body could 
internalize them proactively when converted into a hermeneutic phenomenological process. Part 
III emphasizes the role of the spectator, primarily the value of their gaze, as supported by certain 
concepts identified in Jacques Lacan’s “The Split between the Eye and the Gaze” from XI 
(1978), along with a few particular considerations central to the science of psychoacoustics that 
assess music’s value. Part IV introduces a theoretical methodology derived from my research 
constituting the first three parts, delineating a process of emancipation that a dancing body may 
consult and proactively apply before, during and after a performance.   
 Exposing the fundamentals of what stereotypically renders dance as pleasing in nature or 
“aesthetic” in terms of movement quality, in conjunction with the presence of a body that 
delivers such movement quality, will separate normative impressions by defining differences and 
similarities in “aesthetic movement.” Exploring choreographic reason as an imperative used to 
support selective movement choices will clarify what exactly makes movement selection, 
incorporation and presentation aesthetic in itself. As a result, a dancing body/bodies that 
conventionally imitates the choreographer will serve as a vital requisite to evaluate the 
distinctiveness of why aspects, such as imitationalism, formalism and emotionalism, remain 
limited despite ironically holding and suggesting unlimited potential. More often than not, these 
three elements act as reductive terms, confining the dancing body “to the political” without 
offering a performer (dancer) the chance of experiencing an emancipated, performing state. The 
ostensible goal of liberation from the choreographer’s tyrannical static gaze through codified 
languages used to deliver choreography comprises an example that acts as an extension situated 
within the realm of the political. An agreement of a certain idea with oneself is not always an 





may also pose an anti-liberating flux that a dancing body experiences unwillingly, restraining the 
multiplicity of available subjective experiences to favour the choreographer alone. Considering a 
dissemination of the generic, apothegmatic statement “to the political” listed above, how a 
dancing body is assessed over space, time and distance through virtue of the movement it mimics 
or embodies is often classified as an extension framing a politically contingent idea, which can 
be described here as “best something glimpsed at from the periphery of one’s vision, a liminal 
concept that represented the point where knowledge inevitably shaded into ignorance” (Wootton 
21–53). 
Additionally, elements that often reinforce the aesthetic appearance of movement, such as 
distinct costumes, or more specifically, musical notes, sounds or genres in certain settings or 
environments, may influence the degree of artistic merit that choreographers, dancers and 
spectators attribute to what they define as being aesthetic. Theoretically, observing the 
unnecessary separation of roles in contemporary improvised dance may mediate the 
consolidation of emancipating factors necessary in order for the dancing body, choreographers 
and spectators to coexist as an equal body. It could also be said that this equality relies less on 
the artistic reception and more on the artistic process responsible for creating what Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz would describe as an apperceptive chance. For Leibniz, a concrete definition is 
observed in section 4 of the Principles of Nature and of Grace (1714), where he affirms that 
apperception is “consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state.” In turn, the 
outcome of both the creative process and its reception are a culmination of procedural 
convergences that eventually dissolve to exist as unanimously and successive with each other as 
an aesthetic experience becomes readily available. This harmonization of roles can itself be said 





nature of this pre-emancipated experience contains the notion of uniting separate bodies that are 
naturally in tension with each other (choreographer versus dancer versus spectator) into one 
common representing body. The harmonization of the common representing body occurs during 
the reflection, reception and silence of the proposed observed aesthetic. Essentially, this concept 
is worth investigating as the belief that follows is that emancipation in a particular, politically 
contingent environment may come to exist when an equilibrium between all three converging 
bodies unites to create “a common consciousness.” This renewed conscious experience is itself 
an emancipated state for the duration of the creative process leading through the final 
performance. Evaluating the causality of the ever-evolving power of constructed movement 
distributed from choreographer to dancer and shared evenly and willingly between them suggests 
why emancipated movement may co-exist as a representational characteristic of aesthetic 
movement; whereby emancipated movement is itself aesthetic movement. 
It is important to note that not all choreography has a narrative structure. Often, viewers 
seek to make sense of a work by attempting to find or create their own narrative to distil their 
overall viewing experience. Interestingly in this case, choreography contains a dualistic property 
of aesthetics: one that delivers a set narrative even if the structure or intention of a piece is 
comprised of mainly improvised, abstracted movement, and secondly, the body moving as one 
intends to move it, which stands as a separate apperceptive aesthetic, non-dependent on the 
narrative perceived and entirely arbitrary in outcome despite being cognizant through 
momentum. These dualistic properties (despite eliciting particular contextualizations in a 
narrative structure) propose that although the body and the movement in this case are considered 
equal to the manifestation of choreography, the idea that the choreographer proposes that initially 





but rather a pragmatic movement idea that simply exists in the internal present (Erlebnis). More 
often than not, the choreographer enables movement potentiality and suggestion though their 
gaze before it is converted to a physical structure. It is only after a dancing body embodies such 
movement that the possibility of an “autonomous chance at becoming,” or as Heidegger would 
claim, authenticity of existing in the world prevails (Inderweltsein). This idea suggests that it is 
indeed possible to attain an emancipated dancing state earlier rather than later in a creative 
process. The term “autonomous” serves as a derivative of Kantian thought, suggesting that 
choreography remains and retains selective control of the choreographer alone with little room 
for augmentation from the dancers’ point of view. Also, it would seem that perhaps in systematic 
attempts to preserve one’s role, once movement is finalized for a performing space, it ought to be 
performed in an “authentic way,” representing primarily both the manner and matter of the 
choreographer’s intentions. Authenticity may then be reduced to the degree of manner and matter 
calibrated from the choreographer’s intimacy, limitation or selectivity.  
Yet what is authentic movement? In the 1950s, dance therapist Mary Starks Whitehouse 
insightfully defined authentic movement as a type of therapeutic movement rooted in Carl Jung’s 
concept of active imagination where the visceral manifestation of improvised movement seeks to 
reconcile neural depth and intention through “free association of the body.” The issue here 
identifies how emerging aesthetic trends framed and sometimes manipulated though the 
choreographer’s role impede and rigidify the otherwise simplistic, emancipated nature that 
choreographed movement should allow the body to experience in order to be classified as 
unequivocally compelling, not by social authorization but rather by visceral autonomy that 
appropriates movement outcome. This idea may be the reason why choreographers, dancers and 





meant by authentic movement and emancipated movement; authentic movement is emancipated 
movement, just as much as emancipated movement is aesthetic movement. Before the 
choreographer delivers the choreography (even though possibly embedded with strong socio-
cultural and political connotations and implications), it is nothing more than a cognizant and 
improvised impulsive chance of something that has yet to become; movement in and of itself that 
does not necessarily need to be an extension of an already agreed upon aesthetic trend. 
Movement begins as an improvised cognizant possibility whose aesthetic potential emerges once 
its substance-like construct is abolished and converted to a dancer’s physicalized attempt. 
Unsurprisingly, it seems as if the moving body in the art of contemporary improvised dance has 
become a product of capitalist dissolution where a certain articulated movement idea that a 
choreographer initially proposes, and a dancing body later embodies, is often criticized as having 
derived from political contingencies, although this may not be true. André Lepecki recognizes 
the fidelity of this event after the fact in his 2013 TDR: The Drama Review article, 
“Choreopolice and Choreopolitics: or the task of the dancer.” 
Often forgotten, the existence of a dancing body is itself separate to the narrative 
conveyed by and through choreographic intention. The performer’s dancing body is separate to 
the narrative that the choreographer willfully conceives, regardless of the authoritativeness of a 
creative process; a story can be told and understood, but not identically replicated or lived 
through in exactness (Eine Geschichte kann verstanden, aber nicht identisch repliziert werden). 
This being said, improvised nuances adjacent to structured forms of choreography remain a 
viable somatic option that a dancing body can use in order to become emancipated. Dancers in a 
post-modern setting (1950s to present) can attempt to embody an understanding of this 





emancipates their existence, or more appropriately (their body), as artists. In this context, an 
emancipated dancer can be defined as a somatically sensitive and organically uninhibited mover 
that discovers transcendental characteristics and predispositions that compel them to move in a 
way that they choose to with relation but non-dependence on narrative and definitive roles 
promulgated in a creative process. While personally engaging and experimenting with creative 
movement forms, a duet of dancers will obtain the ability to relinquish externalities derived from 
the saturated political and social strata in which they themselves delineate the systematized by-
products that suppress the development of raw, improvised creative movement in a creative 
process. The duet by dancers Kyra Todd and Recce Caldwell that is my thesis performance piece 
is brought through a series of several steps that when reflected on and supported through a four-
stage diagram (see Table 2), theoretically deepen the physical and intellectual processes used 
while creating an improvised piece. Prompt charts consisting of monosyllabic terms, neutral 
statements and images of effigies guide, inform and shape the neural framework that both 
dancers adopt. The somatic properties such as altered states and proprioceptive reasoning that 
often remain dormant while improvising emerge through the evident convergences in 
performance aesthetics, philosophy and phenomenology, eventually creating what I call an 










Part I | The Omnipresent, Converging Aesthetic of Choreographer and 
Dancer: The Theoretical Universality of Two Minds and One Body 
 
Myriad are the intersections that locate dance in the realm of the political. The 
conceptions of who can move for what, the conventions by which people gather, the 
spaces made available, the training and preparation, notions of embodiment—all bear 
upon dance, and constitute the field of forces and constraints through which it is borne 
into being. Yet dance also makes its own politics, crafts its own pathways and agency in 
the world, moves us toward what we imagine to be possible and desirable. Dance 
tangibly if momentarily materializes bodies assembled on their own behalf, a social 
ensemble made by its own means towards its immediate ends . . . (Randy Martin, qtd. in 
Emerging Bodies: The Performance of Worldmaking in Dance and Choreography  29, 
2011 
 
I use Randy Martin’s quote to open Part I, indirectly relating the importance of political theory 
with dance and the value that hermeneutics carries over the assemblage of how the politics of 
aesthetics and continental philosophy can come to inform notions of embodiment in improvised 
contemporary dance forms. This part begins with an introduction of the four main erudite 
political theorists whose contributions to the field of academia extend beyond the seemingly 
detached and exclusive domain of political thought. As Martin indicates, the myriad of 
intersecting frameworks between dance and the political suggest that by using fragments of ideas 
and concepts from seemingly incompatible domains of thought such as critical theory, aesthetics 
and phenomenology, a coherent methodology comes to exist through the very intersections 
related both directly and indirectly within these two base fields. In turn, what these theorists later 
assemble as critiques, mainly toward the practice of art, can unquestionably run adjacent to all 
forms of art, including dance, rather than their primary focus of visual art. What the following 
publications listed below use as a solidified investigation of a fixed subject matter conditions 
one’s understanding of a similar subject matter by rerouting and reconfiguring their notion as to 





through hermeneutics. From George William Friedrich Hegel’s Introduction to Lectures on 
Aesthetics (1993), through Alain Badiou’s Handbook of Inaesthetics (2005)¸Jacques Rancière’s 
Dissensus (2010) and The Emancipated Spectator (2009), and finally Diana Taylor’s “Acts of 
Transfer” (2003), I will use hermeneutics to assess these texts by intersecting and intervening 
ideas and concepts by relating them directly to contemporary dance.  
Hegel denotes how fine art is intended to arouse feeling, more specifically that which we 
associate as being intrinsically pleasing (Hegel 314). As consciousness runs central to one’s 
ability to embody how they perceive a pleasing state of mind, it must mean that a certain set of 
beliefs, customs and predispositions enable their understanding of what it is that they consider 
pleasing in the first place. Hegel goes on to describe that the opposite is true for poetry: 
The reverse is the case with poetry. In poetry all depends on the representation—
which must be full of matter and thought⸺of man, of his profounder interests, 
and of the powers that move him; and therefore mind and heart themselves must 
be richly and profoundly educated by life, experience, and rejection, before genius 
can bring to pass anything mature, substantial, and self-complete (Hegel 102). 
 
Here, while intellect still acts as instrumental to what one understands as being pleasing, the 
element of language is directly analyzed as a virtuous product of artistic creation. Poetry relies 
on the poet’s ability to perpetuate a sense of satisfaction from the mere feeling of reading, 
regardless of whether the words being visualized on the page exhibit contradescriptive emotions. 
In contrast to visual art, which is a direct exposition of a concept through an image, poetry often 
informs audiences by allowing their intellect to appropriately judge discourse through both 
interpretations (deutung) and empirical facts (erfahrungstatsache). For example, Kantian thought 
differentiates between art, which holds the ability to be described as simply “beautiful,” in 
contrast to that of the “sublime,” which contextualizes art’s embedded, manipulative and implicit 





once the gaze comes into contact with art. The Kantian ideological framework of the beautiful 
(form) and the sublime (excess of form) needs to consider a measure of what most would classify 
as “spirituality” in order to classify what it is that dancers observe and feel as liberating through 
the artwork. In relation to the choreographer and the dancer, typically in Western theatre dance 
(contemporary dance) or in a studio setting, the choreographer offers a vision that they convert 
into visualized motion so that the dancer accordingly embodies such into a mimetic 
representation of somatic value. The segment of “the beautiful” here is in the form and the matter 
of distribution that the choreographer uses in order to translate thoughts into actions. However, 
the sublime in dance is relatively difficult to assess as it only exists for a matter of seconds. In A 
Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1756), Part II 
Section I: [Of the Passion Caused by the Sublime], Edmund Burke cleverly observes that “the 
passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is 
astonishment: and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, 
with some degree of horror.” Proponents of movement exploration often dismiss the element of 
improvisation, which occurs simultaneously with the information being transferred from the 
choreographer to the dancer. Additionally, it is often argued that seemingly mimicked movement 
is never identically replicated. In the moment that such a transfer occurs, improvisation is a type 
of excess of form and is not something that binds itself to a common reality. Improvisation from 
the dancer simply exists in between the realms of truth and artistic inquiry. As Hegel describes 
the moralistic proposition that art inevitably offers the spectator in the quote below, it could be 
said that improvisation in dance acts as a moralizing agent that infers with the possibility of the 
body becoming emancipated for the moment where such separation begins:  
This antithesis [of the will in its spiritual universality to its sensuous natural 





region of moral action; but also emerges as a fundamental distinction and antagonism 
between that which is real essentially and in its own right, and that which is external 
reality and existence (Hegel 138). 
 
In relation to choreography, Hegel seems to be acknowledging the importance that tradition and 
culture hold against refining artistic intention and intuition. However, it is certain that he would 
agree that culture erodes the commonality that would bind choreographers and dancers in unison 
during a creative process. A displacement of reason for dancing a certain way or desire for 
embodying a certain phrase of movement always contains an element of conflicting interests 
between the active dancer and the passive choreographer, which dismantles my objective of 
creating the possibility of emancipating the dancing body and mind.  
In part II, β (the end of art), Hegel examines “what is good to imitate” in art. He states 
that “seeing that the principle of imitation is purely formal, to make it the end has the result that 
objective beauty itself disappears. For the question is in that case no longer of what nature that is 
which is to be copied, but only whether it is correctly copied” (Hegel 124). Reciprocal to this 
claim, Badiou states that “the pertinent unit for the thinking of art as an imminent and singular 
truth is thus neither the work nor the author, but rather the artistic configuration initiated by an 
eventual rupture⸺it is an artistic truth, and everybody knows that there is no truth of truth” 
(Badiou 12). If we were to compare these two imperative considerations, we might conclude that 
an emancipated body comes to exist when the dancer and choreographer reconcile measures of 
improvisation by embracing non-dependency towards factors of subjective manipulation and 
objective mimicry. An example of a method that can be used in dance may include an arbitrary 
collective movement exploration that a camera records. Upon reviewing the documented filmed 
footage, the element of chance itself is conditioned as the non-dependant variable that informs 





of instructions promises that the movement exploration need not be inhibited by objective 
suggestions or subjective predispositions compelling the dancer or the choreographer to narrate a 
future that does not exist, but instead co-create a present while simultaneously bearing in mind 
the sensory value that Hegel advocates for in vivifying artistic value.  
Badiou’s Handbook of Inaesthetics provides ample evidence of an evocative method that 
can be used toward the purpose of transforming a dancing body so that it might experience 
emancipation. It is also important to mention that for Badiou, “dance is not an art, because it is 
the sign of the possibility of art as inscribed by the body” (Badiou 69). In chapter six of Dance is 
a Metaphor for Thought, Badiou introduces a number of vital considerations of what dance 
simply begins as but soon after dissipates and alienates the dance from the dancing body. He 
defines dance as the a priori, almost a transcendental characteristic that the body pursues as: 
“dance is innocence, because it is a body before the body. It is forgetting, because it is a body 
that forgets its fetters, its weight. It is a new beginning because the dancing gesture [body] must 
always be something like the invention of its own beginning” (Badiou 57). Here, it is also 
important to mention Rancière’s ideological framework of pensiveness that appears in chapter 
five of The Emancipated Spectator where pensiveness “refers to a condition that is 
indeterminately between the active and the passive. As in a photograph or portrait, this 
indeterminacy problematizes the gap . . . between two ideas of the image: the common notion of 
the image as duplicate of a thing and the image conceived as artistic operation” (Rancière, 
Emancipated 107). 
This opinion would logically stem from a teleological perspective, whereby analyzing the 
body as a totality while experimenting with movement creation aims to limit the condemnation 





Badiou’s definition of dance rarely suits an embodied tendency, as the duplicate image of a 
common notion (in this case the aspect of narrative) replaces and distorts the dancing body-
conceived artistic operation. It is important to mention that we are not equating the 
choreographer’s position to that of the dancer; the latter’s dancing body is often stigmatized and 
alienated through the former’s choreographic gaze. As the process of choreography occurs 
simultaneously with the element of spontaneity in movement exploration, it could be assumed 
that there is nothing to suggest their mutual exclusiveness or the impossibility of their 
coexistence. Badiou claims that “dance is a metaphor for thought precisely inasmuch as it 
indicates, by means of the body, that a thought, in the form of its eventual surge, is subtracted 
from every pre-existence of knowledge” (Badiou 66). So then how can one reconcile with the 
affect that exists due to the exclusiveness of a gaze from both the choreographer and the dancer? 
Badiou offers a suggestive remediation used to nullify the exploitative threshold experienced at 
the level of the dancing body’s self. Badiou rivals Heideggerian thought by claiming that 
classical art is not concerned with the prevailing of truth, even though with dance, a certain truth 
may come to exist arbitrarily though exposure and adaptation when using structural narrative. 
Badiou insightfully notices that “dance is subtracted from the temporal decision. In dance, there 
is something that is prior to time, something pretemporal. It is this pretemporal element that will 
be played out in space. Dance is what suspends time within space” (Badiou 61). In this case, as a 
dismantling in the temporal-spacio horizon occurs when movement transcends codification from 
the choreographer, or more importantly, if it transcends codification, the result of delivering 
choreography should be more than what it was to begin with. As the homogeneity of time 
remains suspended once the question is asked where is time, or more accurately, where is the 





before and during the time it is performed enframes the flux of control between what 
choreographs who or rather who choreographs what. 
Badiou claims that “dance is a poem set free of any scribes apparatus” (Badiou 65). 
Moreover, he also offers dancers a possibility at embodying a single entity position when 
confronted with manipulative tactics from the choreographer’s gaze. Badiou claims that dance 
itself comes to exist when subjective chatter has been eliminated; “‘abstraction’, that in the end, 
a pure notion arises, the idea of presence” (Badiou 30). It is here where the dancing body can 
become emancipated by virtue of allowing the body to fine-tune its conscious tendencies while 
letting an unfettered, uninhibited mode of abstract experimentation replace the otherwise 
ambiguous structure of interrogative narrative cultivation that most choreographers idealize.   
Specific theories mentioned in Rancière’s Dissensus also redefine the scope that 
choreographers often embrace toward their dancers. The impartial, impractical choreographic 
phenomenon that suppresses the assimilation of an otherwise emancipated body can be further 
investigated. Specifically, the use of selectivity in the choreographer’s gaze is to blame. 
Theoretically, it would seem that when a choreographer acts capably while they think and thinks 
while they act, a dancer does not think or question but simply obeys. Essentially, the 
“potentiality-for-being of human [Da-sein] is mollified through the passive, unconscious shock 
[stoss] of what derives from choreographer selectivity” (El Bizri 54). Similarly to Freud and 
Lacan who situate truth in artworks through the variable of desire, in chapter twelve of 
Dissensus, Rancière declares that art is often positioned in a method of resistance toward the 
emerging proponents of time and concept. This claim is quite precise as once again, 
interpretation is a vital component of artistic acumen, one that is necessary to deploy rationality 





choreographic writing is itself a style of notation, the liberating sense of framing a personal 
memory still favours the exploitative creative process to which most dancers often remain 
oblivious. Rancière denotes two vital counterparts of art that may be used to effectively mobilize 
an emancipative process: “the two concepts of relation and infiltration epitomize the trend. These 
concepts represent two attempts to transform the hackneyed critiques seeking to demonstrate the 
power of the market or the media into a form of direct social action” (Rancière, Dissensus 146). 
Where the choreographer’s reframing occurs simultaneously with the dancer’s ability to address 
its importance by embodying it, there is often very little room for absolute improvisation. This 
selectivity introduces the element of chance, which fuels the infiltration of arbitrary likeliness 
that the choreographer will either disagree with or accept, (despite) what it is that they are seeing 
is their labour before it becomes the dancer’s labour. Surly, small nuances may be interpreted as 
a dancer’s interpretation, but they are still wholly dependent on the selectivity of the 
choreographic gaze. Rancière proposes the following observation in relation to critical art: 
For critical art is not so much a type of art that reveals the forms and contradictions of 
domination as it is an art that questions its own limits and powers, that refuses to 
anticipate its own effects. This is why perhaps one of the most interesting contributions to 
the framing of a new landscape of the sensible has been made by forms of art that accept 
their insufficiency⸺that refuse the sculpture⸺performance model⸺or by artistic 
practices that infiltrate the world of market and social relations and then remain content 
to be mere images on cibachrome, screens and monitors (Rancière, Dissensus 149). 
 
The precision in this quote lies in affirming that the sculpture-performance model is similar to 
that of the choreographer and the dancer—the choreographer internalizes the role of the sculptor 
and the dancer becomes the clay for performance. Moreover, choreographers seem to be 
apathetic toward the artistic egalitarianism that most dancers wish to experience. Dissensus as a 
concept remains inseparable to any form of art, especially to that of dance, which is considered 





the degree to which the dancer can become emancipated as the very ephemerality of a creative 
movement phrase delineates the mimetic predispositions that the choreographer dictates and 
imprints through time, distance and space. For example, Rancière contributes valuable insight 
toward this idea when claiming that aesthetic rupture is the source of dissensus: “tension between 
the presentation of sensory awareness and the clarification of revision of what one understands” 
(Rancière, Dissensus 139). Here, the embeddedness of a social hierarchy predicate may be used 
to power the very existence of creative movement in dance. As almost all movement has more or 
less undergone repetition or mimicry over generations, certain movements have been wrongfully 
classified as inherently political, such as the possible wrongful assumption that movement 
incorporating a rope explicitly references Martha Graham’s Night Journey (1947). Interestingly, 
the dissensus in this case actually pervades the aesthetic rupture from occurring truthfully since 
the dancing body relinquishes individuality to favour only the choreographer’s interpretation. 
Here, interpretation is investigated and pursued solely by the choreographer who transforms it 
into a type of intellectual subterfuge that disregards the dancing body as a necessary but 
unrefined and fabricated instrument by almost deeming it as an external entity to the movement 
idea being pursued; a vessel whose essence and presence remains suspended without the ability 
to level with a common agreement in the what, why or how interpretation that the choreographer 
is administering. Additionally, it is worth noting that Rancière’s critical dispotif is described as 
one of two responses to consensus: where firstly, “art must become more ambitious at 
problematizing the presuppositions that construct a system of stultification, and secondly, that art 
must be a space of refuge for dissensus” (Rancière, Dissensus 145). It is clear that although this 
quote belongs to an alternative publication later used in Rancière’s essay, The Emancipated 





emphasize for dancers. By questioning the fragile nature of dominant social structures that are 
imbued in the choreographer-dancer relationship, dissensus in given choreography can 
reconfigure a dancer’s interpretative lens accordingly, which will vivify their artistic intention 
while embodying such movement.  
Examining the specific theories that Rancière proposes in The Emancipated Spectator 
can be achieved by narrowing the scope to the distortion of the gaze. Rancière introduces French 
philosopher Guy Debord who identifies the locus of the passivity within the “essence of the 
spectacle” as a type of power that alienates the self from one’s own life—“the more he 
contemplates, the less he lives” (qtd. in Rancière, Emancipated 6). This quote embraces the very 
element of inclusivity that is needed for a dancer to properly emancipate themselves in a 
choreographic process. A dancer often conforms to the choreographer’s demands through a 
psychoanalytic process identified as cognitive transference. The customs, beliefs and traditions 
informing the choreographer’s “signature” retain aesthetic exclusivity; a somewhat sensible 
method that assumes proper integration of movement to suit a certain environment and create a 
certain atmosphere. However, the transference often affects the dancer’s ability to create and 
develop their body’s proprioceptive tendencies as they begin to accept such customs, beliefs and 
traditions as a means to an end. The created affect literally compels the switching of roles, where 
the dancer becomes the choreographer and the choreographer becomes the dancer. By doing so, 
simplicity overrides artistic intention and is eventually relinquished to parallel the compelling 
gaze of what the choreographer alone declares to be compelling. This mimetic (mimetikum) 
representation on behavioural predispositions condemning dancers to experience an inequality of 
intelligence can be observed in the procedure where Rancière denotes: 
. . . the ignoramus, spelling out signs, to the scientist who constructs hypotheses, [is 





other signs and proceeds by comparisons and illustrations in order to communicate its 
intellectual adventure and understand what another intelligence is endeavoring to 
communicate to it (Rancière, Emancipated 10). 
 
In this respect, the dancer carries the same intellectual capacity to manifest compelling 
choreography but fails to assimilate it on a physical level as they are influenced to abide by the 
certain selectivity in the choreographer’s gaze. The dancer then forfeits intelligence in the form 
of personal improvisation (when a strict phrase is deliberately enforced), suggesting that their 
acceptance is silently acknowledged as a critique toward the unparalleled, undeniable 
intelligence that the choreographer egoistically practices.  
So then how does one emancipate the spectator when the spectator is the dancer (the 
dancer viewing the choreographer)? Rancière argues that it is done by “first overcoming the gulf 
separating the activity from passivity” (Rancière, Emancipated 12). Yet with attempts to 
diminish the degree of “stultification experienced between the art purveyor (choreographer) and 
the spectator (the dancer) so to de-rigidify from activity and passivity, we must firstly reinforce 
and co-create embodied allegories of inequality” (Rancière, Emancipated 12). Rancière then 
identifies a consolidating remedy that may limit the denial that ignoramuses (choreographers) 
face by defining that “emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between viewing 
and acting; when we understand that the self-evident facts that structure the relations between 
saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the structure of domination and subjection” 
(Rancière, Emancipated 13). The delicate nature of emancipation that expands from one’s own 
perception of aesthetics derives from the intrinsic uniqueness that renders meaningfulness in 
attestations. Intellectual capacity reflects individuality from our sensation of belonging to a 
collective community. For Rancière, there exists an amalgam of interdependent, individual 





or satisfy authoritative figures such as the choreographer. Even though capacity is exercised 
through an “unpredictable interplay of associations and dissociations,” we should accept our own 
capacities optimistically through our own existences, without entitling [our] existences to those 
of others (Rancière, Emancipated 17). Ideally, the contested role of autodidactic choreographers 
should embrace an equilibrium of thoughtfulness; where neural processes abide by virtuous 
intelligence worth sharing as intelligence proper and not as an intelligence. For Rancière, “an 
emancipated community is a community of narrators and translators” (Rancière, Emancipated 
22). In this quote, there exists a method of communication that develops and maintains 
collaboration as a tactic used to refine artistic intelligence on both sides. Interpretation and 
improvisation should be promoted to mobilize the dynamic, intellectual tools necessary to create 
compelling dance, ensuring that dominance from the gaze does not suppress the perpetual 
existence of the body in a vulnerable space.  
Lastly, Diana Taylor’s concept of “Acts of Transfer” from “Translating Performance,” 
published in Performance in 2001, can be assessed as an allegory, capturing the possibility of 
how a dancing body may become efficiently and effectively emancipated through her insights. 
She introduces the field of anthropology and sociology relating to the culture of Latin America, 
deconstructing certain words such as acción and representación by conjoining them to the 
problem of using the generalized term “performance” as a central tenet that, due to its false 
cognates of performative and performativity, often dismisses and alienates the various 
behaviours it covers (Taylor, Translating 47).Taylor soon after acknowledges that “a dance, a 
ritual or a political demonstration requires bracketing or framing that differentiates it from other 





contrary, the idea that performance distils a truer truth than life itself runs from Aristotle . . . to 
the present. (Taylor, Translating 46)    
This notion is important considering how various ideas through verbal transmission 
become eroded through space and time when being delivered by the choreographer to the dancer. 
Considering the dancer’s role, the reception of tracing another image or event from the 
choreographer retains with it a dense, culturally and politically active memory that has and holds 
exclusive rights by and through the respective body that shares it. It is quite difficult to impose 
the result that a dancer has successfully embodied a translated tracing of someone else’s 
memory. Taylor goes on to say that “the many uses of the word performance point to the 
complex, seemingly contradictory, and at times mutually sustaining layers of referentiality” 
(Taylor, Translating 45). Taylor’s claim is rightfully accurate.  
However, what is manifested as being politically legitimate in creative movement begins 
from the implicit awareness that is used to create improvised nuances. This is often overlooked. 
These nuances inform and reform political connotations throughout a phase of movement 
integrated in such a way as to balance both the choreographer and the dancer equally, without a 
certain role superseding the qualitative composition of what evolves into compelling live 
movement. Equality has the potential of prevailing here, proposing an intellectual levelling 
between the dancer and the audience that exists on the basis of the same equality experienced 
between the choreographer and the dancer. The ocularcentrism that binds the audience to the 
dancer does not consider the implicitness of movement control, creation and condition that the 
dancer embodies. Instead, the gaze only dictates a partial cognitive impulse that the audience 





analyzing the origin of why the movement must necessarily be performed in the way that it is 
presented. 
 The imposition of the ocular split that wrongfully asserts a lack of omnidimension when 
visualizing the dancing body actually inhibits its emancipation as it is unable to level with the 
dancer. Taylor refers to performance art, which carries strong aspects of dramatic theatricality 
that are often used to engage the audience with characteristics that they readily understand. In an 
effort to promote identity accessibly, Taylor denotes the difference between how “theatricality 
strives for efficaciousness, not authenticity. It connotes a conscious, controlled, and thus always 
political dimension that performance need not imply” (Taylor, Translating 48). Dance, however, 
does strive for authenticity as the vulnerability of the dancing body in a controlled space calls for 
uncontrollable emotions while dancing, although the dancer often works at riding their emotions, 
which is a cultivating practice of controlling and measuring liveness. No matter how tedious of a 
process the choreographer-dancer relation is prior to performing for a live audience, the dancer 
will have to accordingly recalibrate their consciousness in order to relate to the collective 
presence of a much larger spectacle. Here, the omnipresence of the dancing body on stage senses 
and sentences the dimension: how well does the dancer simultaneously bind with both the given 
choreography and the unique ability to internalize it so to augment it and convert it into their 
own?  
Here, the acts of transfer that remain inseparable from the artistic intention and objective 
carry with them a metaphysical proponent of validation that is used to inform and refine the 
transition of firstly contemplated language and thought into provocative, compelling movement. 
Considering the dancer and choreographer in the choreographic process, Taylor’s insights 





acquiring a body’s trust in a vulnerable space that dominant social and cultural hierarchies often 
suppress, which the choreographer usually further synthesizes and monitors. A possibility of 
emancipating the dancing body begins before the procedural demands take place through the 
collective aesthetic that choreographers often strive for to satisfy audience members. Unlike the 
efficacious nature on which theatricality depends, improvised dance should enable the body to 
explore only as much as it needs to in terms of external implications. The body may very well 
exist as a politically capable, culturally diverse entity, yet with the practice of improvised dance, 
the body should aim to investigate an intrinsically intimate dimension of somatic possibilities 
that derive from intrinsic predispositions that create movement for movements’ sake and not for 


















Part II | The Dancing Body and its Presence through Pensiveness: 
Using Hermeneutics to Demystify Three Somatically Compatible Terms 
Responsible for Creating the Condition of a Dance 
 
Still, another aspect of aesthetic intent is involved. The dancer deals not just with 
movement, but with the motivational source, idea, or metaphor behind the movement, 
that which the movement will bring to mind. Even if the dance is stylistically abstract, it 
will draw our attention to its unique unfolding to movement patterns in space-time. 
Movement patterns are also images, as they impress the imagination, as the word 
“image” implies. The imaginative, or meaningful, level of the dance may be the focus of 
phenomenological description (Fraleigh 14) 
 
Sondra Fraleigh’s insights on phenomenology through dance reiterate the importance that 
hermeneutics carries over how a body might become emancipated in improvised movement 
forms. The images located outside of dance, such as those created through the use of language, 
convert into somatic possibilities that a dancer contemplates before strategically integrating them 
to deepen their experience while improvising. The once arbitrary impulses vanish as they are 
substituted with substantially enhanced, intellectually bound intentions. In this section, noticing 
how demystifying three somatically compatible terms responsible for creating the condition of a 
dance will, in turn, reinforce the very principles needed to determine the overall level of somatic 
commitment reflected by Fraleigh in the aforementioned quote. Hermeneutically speaking, Diana 
Taylor’s prior concept of “Acts of Transfer” engages and prepares its audience for acquiring the 
necessary dialectical framework to understand how an emancipated dancing body may come to 
fruition. Taylor quotes Victor Turner, for whom “performances revealed culture’s deepest, truest, 
and most individual character” (Taylor, Translating 45). Guided by a belief in performances’ 
universality and relative transparency, Turner claims that populations can grow to understand 





opposite: the “constructedness” of performance signals its artificiality—it is “put on,” antithetical 
to the “real” and “true” (Taylor, Translating 45). Interestingly, it would seem that if one were to 
assume the value of a performance rooted in epistemic predispositions, they could deduce that 
old knowledge constantly informs and reconfigures the spectator’s perspective in analyzing 
present phenomena referenced in performances (i.e., embedded political connotations, techno-
scientific principles, etc.). Why? Rancière would state that the creation of art should be to 
problematize and disseminate the presuppositions that construct a system of stultification. The 
ramifications of favouring the new without understanding why the new exists or where it comes 
from fundamentally neutralizes the artist’s role by pervading artistic empathy through a lack of 
human-documented accuracy and dimensionality. 
This section, rooted in Heideggerian existentialism, investigates the role of the dancer in 
correlation to the paronomasia (homonymic resemblances) between the terms dance, prance and 
trance while simultaneously interpolating the particularity of three German idealist, 
phenomenologically centred and compatible terms: Geisteswissenschaft (human sciences, or the 
interaction of subjective and objective elements), Gleichursprünglichkeit (equiprimordiality or 
the gliding) and Erlebnis (inner lived experience). I will use hermeneutics to propose a 
harmonizing latency of pensiveness available for embodiment, initiated through the causal, 
synergistic alchemy that these particular terms create. What surfaces is a methodological basis 
that can firstly be used to clarify and simplify aesthetics in non-narrative movement forms that a 
creative mover explores. I propose that by suggesting the mutual exclusiveness of these terms 
(Geisteswissenschaft, Gleichursprünglichkeit and Erlebnis) and their eventual levelling, non-
dependence toward narrative or the implicit need to fortify a certain topic, trend, custom or belief 





propensity (body phenomenology) experienced at the time of improvisation, and secondly, where 
this framework informs the emergence of an emancipated state, as I will discuss in Part IV. 
The table below can be used to distill the generic copula “as being” conveyed in the 
following statement that I created—“being in dance cannot exist without the prance, as the 
prance in dance creates the trance.” This statement should be used as a neurological tenet before 
and during the movement exploration. It also acts as a suitable linguistic prompt that a dancer 
might follow, leading into an emancipated state. Table 1 is a tool that can be used to decipher the 
seemingly paratactic structure composing the aforementioned statement.   
 
Table 1  
Their being before and the clearing of their being during (Da-sein) (of the respective 
creative mover) in improvised dance forms 
Geisteswissenschaft                                            = to (the) being in the dance 
↓ 
Human sciences or the interaction of subjective and objective elements  
Gleichursprünglichkeit                                            = the act of the prance 
↓ 
Equiprimordiality or the gliding 
Erlebnis                                            = the trance embodied by (the) being in the dance 
↓  
Inner lived experience  
 
 
Mainly focusing on contemporary dance, narratives often conveyed in structured 
choreography offer spectators a solidified, physicalized version of a choreographer’s intended 
vision. Through a compelling display of various articulated movements, choreography generally 
seeks approval by virtue of the reactive agency distributed by a spectator’s sign of enjoyment 
and understanding of a narrative. Lepecki’s notion of the “choreo-theoretical-perceptive” 





subject that can be applied retroactively when examining these three somatically compatible 
terms:   
Only by daily reinventing for oneself a body-for-living—a reinvention that is about 
activating memory (cellular memory, affective memory, muscular memory) for the 
present and not about repeating information for the already archived future—can the 
dancer create for him- or herself other modes of dancing and thus foster other modes of 
understanding dance perceptively and theoretically (Lepecki, Apparatus of Capture 122). 
 
The embedded para-psychological substrate of pensiveness is an irrefutable variable that remains 
on standby before, during and after experiencing whatever a dance is. However, it is often 
overlooked that if a spectator were to be a witness to a creative mover’s improvised technique 
that remains dependent on non-narrative involving chance and spontaneity, such aesthetic 
approval would remain limited to the mover alone, without considering the spectator. This 
aesthetic flux creates the possibility of a suggestive authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) identified 
through the bearing of the term Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in dance). Interestingly, the 
subversive anomaly of the term “authenticity” as reflected in Theodor W. Adorno and Frederic 
Will’s The Jargon of Authenticity (1973) remains contested when observed in relation to 
narrative-structured dance forms: 
The aura of authenticity in Heidegger is that it names “nothing”; the “I” remains formal 
and yet pretends that the word contains content in-itself. For Adorno, Heidegger's 
existentialism is a new Platonism which implies that authenticity comes in the complete 
disposal of the person over himself-as if there were no determination emerging from the 
objectivity of history (Adorno and Will xvii). 
 
Yet while observed from the entity enduring improvisation, Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being 
in dance) can itself be an authentic state of being compelling the improvised movement. Let us 
recall that the definition of the term Geisteswissenschaft involves an interaction of both 
subjective and objective elements creating the human sciences; a truism that propels a body in 





having to logically reference them in a particular aesthetic, or as often demonstrated, in a 
narrative structure. This instance also clarifies a contingency riddling the claim of what ought to 
be considered “an aesthetic” in improvised movement. Noticing their (creative movers) “being 
before and the clearing of being during” heading in the table (see Table 1) separates the 
misconception of the “leading into something” before it has “successfully started from nothing.” 
This separation generates Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in dance) by first allowing the 
improvising entity to place subjective reality in opposition with objective influence. It is the 
opposite of narrative structure embodiment. The being before (non-dance) leads into the 
something (dancing) and transforms into the clearing of being. The clearing of being is a result 
of a transfigured aesthetic, whereby improvisation becomes a nuanced principle of a reality 
dismantling the apparition of things otherwise.  
Once the body endures Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in dance), the earthly 
(irdischen) stability of the entity in Euclidean space is relinquished through the acceptance of a 
physically tolerable and perceptible yet transcendental characteristic of das gewaltige (yielding 
to the powerful); in this case, the power of pre-determined movement possibility. The 
anamorphic form of such improvised movement ensures that chance is equally as important in 
the dance’s compositional structure as the physical laws that constitute the body’s ability to 
move in a dance-determined state. Mimetic movement, defined here as embodied movement by 
the dancer from the choreographer, cannot transform into, nor embrace, the affect that 
Geisteswissenschaft offers to the improviser as the somatic synchronicity between these three 
terms (dance→Geisteswissenschaft, prance→ Gleichursprünglichkeit and trance→ Erlebnis) is 
hindered early in the process due to choreographic ocularcentrism. Geisteswissenschaft begins 





and compelling the reason that a dancer moves the way that they choose to, and not the way that 
they were meant to. Wissen is scientific nature, an empirical foundation that a dancer needs to 
acknowledge before pursuing the phenomenological impulse that the mind triggers and that the 
body further senses, synthesizes and physicalizes. As Geisteswissenschaft prevails, the dancer 
begins to embrace adaptability in an improvised movement structure that can now translate into 
an equiprimordial shift adjacent to the term Gleichursprünglichkeit.  
The term Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the prance) reflects a concept known as 
gliding, the equiprimordial leap that in this case considers the dancer enduring the process of 
improvised experimentation before the dance occurs. This second phase or cue imbues the body 
to experience improvised chance in movement creation without guilt so that essentially, 
consequentiality remains devoid of placing the dancer in flux with their own body and the space 
that co-exists and balances their movement. Gleichursprünglichkeit is a mode of reaction to the 
primary particularity of Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in dance), which is exclusive to the 
process of creating a dance. Often a misconception of constructed movement is that no matter 
how movement is verbally or physically distributed and by what role, it begins in itself as an 
improvised chance from an initial circumstance. The circumstances demand an impulse of 
movement, which exists prior to the creation of an improvised phrase as nothing more than a 
somatic possibility or impossibility. The improvised chance emerges on a count of accepting the 
uncalculated precision of what is to become a transition, or more importantly, a translation of 
Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the prance). The gliding is a continuous somatic transition that 
delineates a unique translation for the dancer by virtue of their experience recalling the 
movement before, during and after the fact. The spectator, if present, also desires recollection of 





to movement that the spectator senses only visually. This instance places “the gliding” as the act 
of the prance, that is, the uncalculated calculation of the multiplicity that organizes the basis of 
aesthetics in improvised movement. The entity that has now embodied the first two constituents 
(Geisteswissenschaft [to (the) being in dance] and Gleichursprünglichkeit [the act of the prance]) 
of the three is a step closer to mobilizing what is needed in order for a dance to manifest.  
Gleichursprünglichkeit can further be used to manipulate the sensations of body language 
so to expose a counter-intuitive example of what the spectator or dancer may have felt otherwise. 
For example, the gliding in a non-improvised movement structure remains limited and static due 
to the promulgated refinement in movement ideas and lack of abstraction that the choreographer 
enforces. This is likely because language can only go as far as to describe what aesthetic should 
look or feel like, especially when instructed for someone else to embody. The gliding in this case 
represents the choreographer’s work, as if the choreographer themselves is the dancer, abolishing 
the unique propensity of a somatic chance by replacing it with a strict uniformity of mimicked 
movement. An example that can be related to the partial transference effect that takes place 
between dancer and choreographer includes the applicable circumstances caused by the author’s 
role as identified by Roland Barthes in his essay “Death of the Author” (1967):  
Probably this has always been the case: once an action is recounted, for intransitive ends, 
and no longer in order to act directly upon reality—that is, finally external to any function 
but the very exercise of the symbol—this disjunction occurs, the voice loses its origin, the 
author [choreographer] enters his own death, writing begins . . . the explanation of the 
work is always sought in the man who has produced it, as if, through the more or less 
transparent allegory of fiction, it was always finally the voice of one and the same person, 
the author, which delivered his “confidence” (Barthes 2).  
 
This seeming duplicity in outcome actually fractures and suppresses Gleichursprünglichkeit (the 
act of the prance) from occurring, which would mean that Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in 





of this issue would reveal that the choreographer is actually the dancer but not equal to the 
dancer, while the dancer is the choreographer but not equal to the choreographer⸺a transference 
effect of sorts. This inequality impedes and extends to factors of emancipation that most dancers 
would ideally pursue to maintain the necessary levelling of roles if both Geisteswissenschaft (to 
[the] being in dance) and Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the prance) were to occur. Returning 
to improvised movement structures, one can see how Gleichursprünglichkeit enables a dancer to 
seamlessly transition from one somatic chance to the next. In improvised movement, there exists 
a heightened sense of self-control through self-perceptibility and self-evaluation (when further 
paired with proprioceptive awareness in Euclidean space), which allows the act of the prance to 
occur, not as a forced response to an aesthetic but rather a chance (outcome) from a chance 
(desire of movement impulse before it occurs).  
Most importantly, Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the prance) can be used as an 
intellectual tool to refine the rigid transition often experienced by movement improvisers with 
attempts to construe how the inner lived experience, Erlebnis or the simultaneous pairing of the 
trance, may look or feel. Taking the example of a musical score, timbre is often associated with 
offering a dancer a transcendental reaction to what is being heard in terms of frequency. In turn, 
the feedback alters a dancer’s consciousness accordingly, which compels the body to adjust in 
order to fit the appropriate movement signature. Yet even here, the dominance (like the 
choreographer over the dancer) carries the unique ability to abolish Gleichursprünglichkeit (the 
gliding, or related act of the prance) through its ever-evolving tonality. This suggests something 
particular that the body may not otherwise have accepted if such a musical score were not 
present. It could also be argued that the score’s artificiality (whether or not the music has been 





augments the dancer’s experience at securing the embodiment of the gliding. If we examine the 
ironic counter-example, that is to say, if a musical score were not present, the body as an entity 
enduring improvised movement can itself inhibit its own potential by becoming overpowered 
with what the dancer is most adept at embracing while considering movement vocabulary. 
Silence can, at times, inform the body to base its movement in the sounds that the body itself 
creates, both internally and externally. Adept here is also comfort or composure (calmness); what 
comfort is can easily become imbued with nuances of superficiality through pervading egoism. 
Taking that body language that a dancer expresses in Euclidean space can derive from personal 
emotion, it is important to recognize that for Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the prance) to 
balance both terms and their affiliated contextual reactions, the experimental improvisation needs 
to be fully segmented from anything and everything, making it susceptible to mimicry. An 
arbitrary unforeseen and raw examination of both neural and visceral impulses should, through 
their unification, urge the mover to manifest something that cannot exist in any other way other 
than the way that they (the dancer) intended it to be. The result of the delivered improvised 
movement can now begin the trajectory at becoming the eventual clearing of being with an inner 
lived experience (Erlebnis).  
Finally, Erlebnis (the trance embodied by [the] being in the dance) is paired with the act 
of the trance itself, which is partially para-psychological. The following example by Erika 
Bourguignon in her conference presentation, “The Relationship of Trance and Dance” (1995), 
explores the responsiveness of trance when embodied by a dancer:  
An example of the one might be excitement, as at the peak of a sports event, of the other 
drowsiness induced by monotony, as in highway hypnosis. Such states of hyper-arousal 
or hypo-arousal of the nervous system are both common and diverse. Some are ordinary, 
others extraordinary, perhaps even spectacular. In spite of their diversity, they share a 
number of common characteristics. These include alterations of perception, sensation, 





euphoria and heightened levels of energy. In calling these states examples of 
“dissociation,” I wish to draw attention to a common process that characterizes them, 
namely the narrowing of the focus of attention, so that most ordinary stimuli are 
excluded, for example, sensations of pain, or even a habitual sense of self and personal 
identity. Trancing constitutes a universal human capacity that comes into play in 
numerous circumstances, from the most ordinary and quotidian to the most dramatic, 
ritualized and sacred (Bourguignon 2).  
 
The being begins to transform into non-being by embracing the procedural transitions between 
Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in dance) and Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the prance). 
Here, the particularity of the improvised chance that emerges with every movement that the 
dancer pursues happens without the necessity of creating an aesthetic, but rather to sanctify their 
own and refine it. What comes to be exposed for a spectator or for the respective dancer 
improvising the movement is a mode of consciousness that can never truly be fully exposed in a 
visually observable manner. The trance that isolates the being from non-being exists at the level 
of visceral charisma to which the dancer attunes them self. How well they know their body as a 
result of attempting to experience their dance is a direct evolution of how deep their 
consciousness allows them to experience the possibility of a trance. This tripartite evolution 
endeavours a discovery of all three somatically compatible terms that simultaneously pair with 
the sense of proprioceptive awareness. The degree of the trance is both dependent and non-
dependent on proprioception, which is defined by how well a dancer comes to “feel” through, 
around and within the space that encapsulates their (body) vessel. The method of which the 
trance is dependent on proprioception is if the dancer successfully manages to mobilize their 
body with the environment in such a way as to extend their improvised movement beyond the 
body’s form. For example, as long as the body performs in a space, the larger availability of 
space will subject the body to a type of immersive fetishism by making a dancer feel the need to 





experiences. This is an example where the tendency of dependence actually dilutes the level of 
the trance and Erlebnis (the trance embodied by [the] being in the dance). If one observes a 
counter example of how the trance dependency of proprioception can work with a dancer rather 
than against them, the following can be considered. 
Space dependency can help a dancer maintain their trance only if they know the 
exactness of how the space merges and neutralizes their improvisation. More often than not, a 
performing space can overpower a dancer’s ability to maintain the separation between being and 
non-being so that ideally the trance can be felt and understood for an extended period of time 
once non-being is discovered. The counterexample involves a direct integration and 
incorporation of a portion of a performing space into the structure of the improvisation that the 
dancer pursues. However, this skillful approach is just as vulnerable as it is susceptible to 
emerging a narrative interpretation that can easily erode a trance. A dancer must ensure that 
using the space directly means placing the space as an equal entity adjacent to their own body. 
The dancer must look beyond the conventional clash between materiality and non-being in order 
to maintain the typography of improvisation that will reflect the degree of depth in their trance.  
An example where the trance is non-dependent on proprioception is if the dancer chooses 
to situate their body by performing in nature. Kathy Foley intelligently recognizes the benefit 
behind this practice by employing evidence accumulated during her time spent in West Java, 
Indonesia. In her article, “The Dancer and the Danced: Trance Dance and Theatrical 
Performance,” she notes how: 
the appeal to this type of acting is two-fold. First, there is the attraction of voyeurism: these 
forms allow audiences to see beyond their everyday existence into the normally hidden world 
of the spirits who perform. . . .The second appeal is spectacle: since these spirits are endowed 
with superhuman powers, the entranced performers often engage in activities beyond the 






This particular instance replaces a fixed Euclidean space dimensionality, often presumed and 
equated as a “black-box theatre” with a vector-space multiplicity of infiniteness considering the 
external environment. Although boundaries do exist, the conventional walls restraining a dancer 
to improvise in a certain way are replaced, and the dancer is instead offered a wide range of 
movement alternatives and psycho-somatic methods worth investigating. Incidentally, due to the 
multiplicity of infiniteness that the external environment offers, the dancer will actually be 
compelled to restrict their movement to as small of a region as possible, where less movement 
will actually mean an increased chance at experiencing the depth of a trance. Taking this 
example, choosing between dependence and non-dependence is really a matter of how well the 
dancer knows the capacity and sensitivity of their own body. The transformation between 
Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in dance) through Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the 
prance) and Erlebnis (the trance embodied by [the] being in the dance) is a result of logical 
inferences from a choreographer that the dancer does not listen to per say but rather feels and 
applies proactively at the level of the self before the separation from being into non-being can 
occur through the trance.  
By using hermeneutics to demystify these three somatically compatible terms—
Geisteswissenschaft (to [the] being in dance) through Gleichursprünglichkeit (the act of the 
prance) and Erlebnis (the trance embodied by [the] being in the dance) responsible for creating 
the condition of a dance—one can understand why improvised movement structures could 
simplify a dancer’s course of experiencing an Erlebnis. The lived experience in this case is a 
trance not readily available by questioning the convictions of everyday life but instead by 
“viscerally forgetting” a reality that eventually becomes more than it was previously. By 





transitional transformation between Geisteswissenschaft, Gleichursprünglichkeit and Erlebnis to 
result in the dance’s creation. Discussed previously, the being before (non-dance) leads into the 
something (dancing) and transforms into the clearing of being. The latter is a result of a 
transfigured aesthetic, whereby improvisation becomes a nuanced principle of a reality 
dismantling the apparition of things otherwise. Assuming that any dancer should attempt to 
discover their own embedded trance waiting to prevail, the question lies not with how well a 
choreographer manages to estrange a dancer from discovering non-being by implicitly using 
mimetic principles to guide and impose movement ideas or how obedient a dancer can be at 
embodying and satisfying the authoritative choreographer’s role. The question instead lies with 
how well a dancer places their body into a parallel state of existence that corresponds to “being” 
but does not inhibit the chance of experiencing “non-being.” By evaluating the distinctiveness of 
each term, a new question arises, one that is worthy of analysis and may mediate the 
consolidation of understanding how consciousness itself is the force that guides the trance 














Part III | The Indispensable Spectator: How Jacques Lacan’s “The Split 
Between the Eye and the Gaze” from book XI (1998) Informs the Framing of 
a Dancing Body from the Spectator’s Point of view 
 
 
In this section, I will observe the conglomeration that Lacanian ideologies offer the 
instance of improvised contemporary dance by the reference and shaping that narcissism uses to 
inform the persuasive force that spectators often disregard. Perhaps unwillingly, this partially 
cognitive, disinhibiting force that narcissism uses to reduce the value of the gaze consumes the 
spectator’s ability to differentiate accurately between the intolerable and the uncanny, where 
both realms can be co-representational and co-compatible. The silent “vying” between the bodies 
of a spectator, dancer and choreographer that create a salient alternative to critique can begin 
with questioning the piety of judgment in relation to aesthetics. How can an aesthetic in 
improvised contemporary dance forms in conjunction with the aforementioned hermeneutical 
analysis clarify and vivify the spectator’s ability to “breach the void” without dismissing the 
gazed reality with the sidereal? This section uses various performances as examples that frame 
the emerging methodology that I describe (see Table 2) in Part IV while implicitly using 
Rancière’s “The Split between the Eye and the Gaze” as a foundation that guides a precept to 
which most spectators remain oblivious. In addition, the domain of psychoacoustics will prove 
invaluable to assessing the “onto-visceral” and somatic matter associated with deepening a visual 
experience for an audience by providing them with an accessible, hermeneutical theory.   
Lacan begins by describing the pervasive force that narcissism uses to dilute the stream 





Lacan complicates this understanding of the narcissistic view in the mirror by 
distinguishing between the eye's look and the Gaze. Gaze in Lacan's later work 
refers to the uncanny sense that the object of our eye's look or glance is somehow 
looking back at us of its own will. This uncanny feeling of being gazed at by the 
object of our look affects us . . . (Felluga). 
 
This instance remains consistent with the work of Vito Acconci in Theme Song (1973) (see fig. 
1) where his use of language remains synonymous with an ostentatious display of elusive and 
sensuous suggestions, likely holding the objective to make the spectator uncomfortable and 








Fig.1. Image downloaded from a museum website reproduced in a text 
Acconci. Theme Song. 1973. Video (black and white, sound) 33:15 min. The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art 
 
The gaze that Acconci uses is as piercing as his selection in language, creating a narrative and 
ambiance that embeds itself within and around a favouring of a certain intention within a certain 
embodied identity that may or may not be his identical own:  
Lacan then argues in “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a” that there is an intimate relationship 
between the objet petit a (which coordinates our desire) and the Gaze (which threatens to 





the heart of desire is a misrecognition of fullness where there is really nothing but a 
screen for our own narcissistic projections. It is that lack at the heart of desire that 
ensures we continue to desire.” However, because the objet petit a (the object of our 
desire) is ultimately nothing but a screen for our own narcissistic projections, to come too 
close to it threatens to give us the experience precisely of the Lacanian Gaze, the 
realization that behind our desire is nothing but our lack: the materiality of the 
Real staring back at us. That lack at the heart of desire at once allows desire to persist and 
threatens continually to run us aground upon the underlying rock of the Real (Felluga). 
 
Another of Acconci’s works, Centers (1971), remains consistent with his earlier works, 
resonating with a phenomenological grounding. When examined alongside Lacan’s Seminar XI 
(1998), the fracturing of the succession of the gaze proves that what is seen by the eye is relative 
yet separate to a moment in time and space. Heidegger calls this concept Gestel or the enframing 
of the negative image; in this case, the image that spawns from the spectator as a reflection of, 
but not as an exact mimetic engram of, what is momentarily being perceived. “This disturbance 
in the perception of space is induced by something that is not seen but imagined. It is not space, 
but vision, or rather a different spatiality of vision, which Lacan proposes to diagram in 
introducing the function of the gaze.” (Mariño70) Logically, the audience somehow knows that 
the perception of their gaze is distorted by the movement in realtime as it happens 
simultaneously yet separately. In relation to Centers, the frustrating affect from the attempt to 
create a neural projection of imagination that Acconci’s pointing on screen (see fig. 2) will 
eventually reach its centre to fulfill the desire of both Acconci and the spectator creates an 














Fig. 2. Image downloaded from a non-profit arts organization reproduced in an archive 
Acconci. Centers. 1971. Video (black and white, sound) 22:28 min. New York. Electric 
Arts Intermix (EAI) Electric Arts Intermix (EAI). 
 
Phenomenologically, both realms situated on different planes of existence begin to morph into 
one where the audience literally becomes a by-product of the tension that is both visualized and 
felt. The conjoining of roles in this case creates a unifying body that the gaze accepts and further 
magnifies through the dissolution of engrams closely associated with the neoplatonic notion of 
anamnesis. A trance then begets the level of depth perceptivity that reciprocates the engagement 
a spectator delineates as either viscerally tantalizing (enjoyable through relatedness) or viscerally 
non-associative (disliking through non-relatedness).    
 With reference to the instance of narcissism, both aforementioned examples of Acconci’s 
works carry with them the notion of self-indulgence and egoism closely attributed with any 
performance where spectators are present; after all, performances act as metaphorical mirrors 
used to redistribute an experience in return for another experience. Now, these are the two 





the human psyche used as a conduit (Krauss 180). It is important to remember that despite these 
examples being central to performance for video, the nature of idiosyncratic, ideological 
frameworks developed through hermeneutics used to refine the depth that improvised dance calls 
for considers the same discursive methodologies discussed in the entirety of this thesis. The 
compatibility within seemingly incompatible domains of thought has proven to resolve the flux 
between how, for example in this section, aesthetics can become extinguished or vivified through 
narcissistic elements.  
 More often than not, a spectator relies on the same narcissistic elements used to reduce, 
confine and define their overall engagement with the condition of a dance. The stability and 
dependency of stasis that a spectator often embodies when viewing a dance restricts their gaze 
from experiencing the equiprimordial shift necessary to excite not just all senses of perception, 
but their being in and alongside the performance as a similar performing entity. The gaze seems 
to be a performing entity separate to the mere function of the eyes; where the eyes only see what 
is being presented to them, the gaze remains capable of drawing decisions over how what is 
being seen influences its viewer. If you insert an absolute event into a relative system, no matter 
how much the relative elements change, the absolute event is still there (Jackson and Lethem 
254). If a spectator chooses to interpolate a narcissistic judgment (relative element) with their 
eyes in terms of the “what” a performance consists of (absolute event), the spectator remains 
unable to visualize the foundational noetic predisposition that the gaze would otherwise use to 
assess the “how.” Simply put, the gaze remains capable of digging through multiple layers of a 
vision to clarify the “how,” creating the relative aesthetic that coalesces with the being in a 





lighting, design, music) often restricts a spectator to remain in the realm of the thinking alone 
and omitting reason.  
 When observing the value that a gaze offers to the spectator, the dynamism between what 
is apparent and what is relative begins to reform spatially in such a way that strengthens spectral 
tendencies: 
Lacan appropriates Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological model of vision that 
identifies a fundamental “reversibility” in vision; the body is both subject 
and object, the seeing and the seen. Lacan takes up this notion of 
reversibility, but changes the emphasis of Merleau-Ponty's model through 
insisting that, despite the reversibility of the seeing and the seen, it is the 
possibility of being observed which is always primary (annotated by Lee, 
67–78 Theories of Media, 2003).  
 
This example of Lacanian ideologies can also work alongside those of Merleau-Ponty for whom 
le corps propre—the living body or the body proper—is a moving and perceiving bodily subject, 
which as such constitutes the very site of expression: “the body is eminently an expressive 
space” (Merleau-Ponty 103). Expression here plays a significant role that the spectator willingly 
subscribes to when viewing a performance; the gaze creates expressivity for the spectator who 
remains unable to share dynamic movement, which, in turn, dismisses the vapid, static 
repossession that might wrongfully be best described as something that the spectator can manage 
in a shared performing space. The appositional trajectory of gazes here (the gaze shared amongst 
the performers) and the gaze that connects the spectator to the condition of a performance, 
unifies “the being in the dance” with “the dance in the being” despite losing authenticity along 
the way, as Maria Scott cleverly notes alongside Lacan, due to misrepresentation:   
The gaze is shown to elude representation as much as it escapes vision: In our relation to 
things, insofar as this relation is constituted by the way of vision [our path of vision: ‘la 
voie de la vision’], and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is 
transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it⸺that is what 






Indeed, it is evident that the gaze carries with it a certain degree of distortion, but nonetheless 
provides a spectator with a co-constituent informative lens that can be theoretically inserted into 
that of the performer, strengthening the unification of separated roles in a shared performing 
space.  
 Interestingly, despite the dense, psychoanalytical framework constituting much of 
Lacanian philosophy, the appearance of what Philip K. Dick much later described as 
“discorporating slippage” remains a compatible mode of reasoning that a spectator, perhaps 
unknowingly or unwillingly, resorts to using when ruminating over a live performance. By 
considering the fact that Dick’s discorporating slippage seems to occur over both his 
hypnopompic and hypnagogic states suggests that similar states of consciousness replace a 
spectator’s gaze differently when visualizing a performance as opposed to visualizing something 
else. The pensive degree of devotion that a spectator depends on when fixation occurs with a 
moving performer reveals their (spectators), or as Heidegger puts it (geborgenwerden), secretly 
hidden body consciousness (vuszt-zein) as described as thinking with their body and not the 
mind. As a performer thinks and expresses with their body, so must a spectator in order to 
experience what the gaze authentically offers them, but then what, or more importantly how, 
does a gaze come to offer a spectator authenticity? In order to differentiate accurately what is or 
is not considered authentic in regard to the specificity of the gaze, I introduce a hermeneutic 
assessment of certain ideological theories discussed by Theodor W. Adorno and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty that provide evidence clarifying the much contested topic.    
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970), a translation by Robert Hullot-Kentor, uses a clever 
description that hints at the embedded nature of authenticity in a concept that could be applied 





The universal determinations of art [dance] are not simply an exigency of their 
conceptual reflection. They testify to the boundaries of the principle of individuation, 
which is no more to be ontologized than is its opposite. Artworks get ever closer to these 
boundaries the more uncompromisingly they pursue the principium individuationis; the 
artwork that appears as something universal bears the accidental quality of being an 
example of its genre: It is spuriously individual (Adorno 181). 
 
He soon after goes on to say the following: “The more single-mindedly artworks devote 
themselves to the emerging idea of art, the more precarious becomes the relation of artworks to 
their other, a relation that is itself demanded by the concept. But this relation can be conserved 
only at the price of precritical consciousness, desperate naïveté” (Adorno 181).  
In this example, it would seem that the artwork remains inseparable from its viewer while 
its ontological predicate serves to distill the authentic confirmation that chance perception offers 
the overall experience. Aesthetics is not obliged, as under the spell of its object, to exorcise 
concepts. Rather, its responsibility is to free concepts from their externality to the particular 
object and to bring them within the work (Adorno 180). In this case, multiple aesthetics can be 
seen to converge into one, suggesting that a gaze remains incapable of nullifying creative 
judgment. A spectator often embraces a dualistic personality; the spectator that gazes willfully to 
assess and the spectator that gazes critically to differentiate. This epiphenomenon of the gaze 
grants the spectator ownership of their will to criticize what they see or more importantly, how 
they feel over what they see. Laura U. Marks vitally examines the difference between haptic 
criticism and the more conventional optical visuality whose objective remains to create an 
opinion over a certain subject matter being perceived. Evidently, it is the former haptic method 
that informs and reconfigures the gaze in both the spectator and performer that remains able of 
unifying separate bodies in a common environment:   
Optical seeing depends upon a center, a point in the brain (or is it the soul), where the 
object is reproduced (light carrying its image needle-like through the pupil). These 





observations at a place called the self, deep within us, while our surface remains intact. In 
haptic seeing, all of our self rushes up to the surface to interact with another surface. 
When this happens, there is a concomitant loss of depth⸺we become amoebalike, 
lacking a center, changing as the surface to which we cling changes. We cannot help but 
be changed in the process of interacting. We give up believing that meaning is formed 
after the fact, in our minds, and attribute power to create meaning to the interaction itself. 
In other words, we give up some of our power of self-determination in order to let the 
other transform us (Marks 20).  
 
This example informs Part IV of my methodology where performers interpolate three otherwise 
separated roles by embodying them simultaneously when applying prompt charts to guide and 
shape improvised movement. As a result, by embracing the role of the spectator alongside the 
choreographer and dancer, the spectator can be said to look through the vanishing point in order 
to synthesize their experience of deepening the process by which visceral manifestation 
translates and transforms into an emancipated moment.  
 Moving on, the element of chance that the spectator trusts can also be said to work 
alongside notions of authenticity. How might a shorter lasting, less-refined moment in 
improvised dance resonate a deeper degree of authenticity? How can authenticity as a token of 
improvised movement inform artistic intentions suggesting a strengthening in reason and choice 
despite its arbitrary nature when converted to visceral manifestation? For example, the attraction 
of chance to the artists involved in the surrealist timeframe of the 1920s was primarily 
creative rather than political—it served as a new way to liberate imagery from convention. By 
developing new and individual “automatic” processes, these artists sought to reconcile 
opposing parts of the human experience: the rational and the irrational, the conscious and the 
unconscious, reality and dream (Gale). With a connection to improvised contemporary dance, 
where the performer can share the role of the spectator as well, chance usually compels the 
performer to discover the ambiguity associated with non-narrative impulses or the implicit 





space. In turn, what converts from chance into visceral manifested movement is an attempt to 
characterize the perception of chance as silently visualized before it realistically comes to life. 
Its congruous immediacy, once converted into visceral manifestation, ought to occur as 
quickly as possible to preserve its authenticity as it remains unrefined, uninformed and 
untraceable to previous thought processes that may have used calculability to determine how 
it implicitly should have otherwise come to exist. This instance places trust and chance as 
equal variants whose co-resonance creates the degree to which authenticity is associated once 
visceral manifestation engages. Merleau-Ponty insightfully interweaves an extension of 
phenomenological thought that could be applied to the spectator’s role by noting that “the 
perpetual ‘synthesis’ must be incomplete and perception can only present a ‘real’ to me 
[spectator or performer] by exposing itself to the risk of error” (Merleau-Ponty 396). 
 In this case, error can actually be said to guide and shape not just the performer but the 
spectator as well. For the performer, what feels like an error when devising improvised 
contemporary dance forms, might actually strengthen and solidify the attempt of creating a pure 
chance outcome without predetermined thought selection. For the spectator, error can be said to 
exist when the expected turns, or more appropriately, becomes the unexpected, as I will explain 
in Part IV of my methodology. Error is a mode of chance that guides the principles constituting 
the aesthetic of the uncanny. When the performer trusts the inconsistency and unpredictability of 
error, chance, in return, feels “right” for the body, once mobilized into visceral manifestation, 
rather than wrong.  
An example of an artist that uses the element of “chance” to shape the spectators and 
performers’ experience is John Cage, whose work can also be considered analogous to the 





intended to produce a detailed examination of the present moment (Jensen 97–102). It also 
serves as an implicit oracle of sorts used to shape the product of chance outcome exclusive to 
music. I employed the same ideological framework in my methodology addressed in Part IV, 
wherein a prompt chart works as an analogy adjacent to chaos theory to produce an entirely 
arbitrary and incalculable outcome specific to improvised movement function by following the 
structure that the prompt charts offer to performers. For Cage, the I ching is reputed to reproduce 
the tendencies of the universe, which is an embrace of randomness that conceals a hidden order 
resonating only at a universal level (Jensen 102). The hidden order in my methodology can be 
seen in the four stages that a dancing body proactively applies so to experience the physical 
aesthetic of the uncanny parallel to the gaze; it creates what I describe to be an emancipated 
moment. Additionally, in my methodology, where performers are given the opportunity to use 
both music and silence, similarly to Cage, a reversal effect of sorts is noticed in conjunction with 
chaos theory; where music exists, the performer must look beyond what the score suggests in 
order to examine the depth and silence that coalesces with the body despite the multitude of 
present sounds. Where music does not exist, the performer must create their own mental 
projection of music in the omnipresent silence by employing precognition as a feature that 











Part IV | Emancipating the Dancing Body: How Jacque Rancière’s “The 
Intolerable Image” Propels the Phenomenological Experience from 
Choreographic Bricolage to Create an Aesthetic in Movement Dimension 
 
If there is a visible hidden beneath the invisible, it’s not the electric arc that will reveal it, 
save it from non-being, but the mise en scène of words, the moment of dialogue between 
the voice that makes those words ring out and the silence of images that show the absence 
of what the words say (Rancière 44). 
 
In Part IV, I will demonstrate an experimental, theoretical methodological cosmology 
that has inevitably emerged through the interpolation of the concepts central to the previous three 
parts of this thesis. The partially psychoanalytical methodology that I employ in the studio/in the 
creative process with the dancers imposes the use of distributing neutral questions, monosyllabic 
words as well as the images of three works (one sculptural effigy and two paintings created from 
organic materials) in order to generate a causal relationship between how the seen can create the 
becoming of the unseen, but more importantly, convey how the unveiling of concealed 
convergences creates an emancipated aesthetic for dancers to embody. I chose Nicola Samorì’s 
works to supplement the conversion of eventual viscerally manifested movement that the dancers 
explore. Despite other artists delivering similar works to that of Samorì, I sought visual artworks 
that would support a seamless transition into contemporary dance in order to clarify the mode of 
non-representational thinking that I was aiming for the dancers to embrace when attempting my 
method. Samorì’s works of Ciclope (2020), Caporosa (2019) and Testa Con Lacrima (2017–19) 
are sculptural and visual art works featured in my thesis that represent classical antiquity in a 
postmodern setting. As poetic connotations embedded within these works characterize the 
intolerable construct of aesthetic, the dancer experiments with the creation of a visceral 





terms and images of sculptured effigies from their gaze without control emanating from 
predetermined suggestion. The three artworks were purposefully selected as cranial/neck effigies 
as opposed to full body renders as they seize the possibility of solipsism and apathy clouding the 
dancer’s body through their reduced affect of creating a bounded sense through codification.  
This idea followed the intention to allow the dancer to transcend codification, censorship 
or fetishization thereby strengthening the existential attempt to liberate the dancing body from 
the body’s dance through the presence and deepening of a trance. Idealistically, the distorted, 
intolerable effigy represents just enough artistic incentive to create a somewhat equiprimordial 
penetration that becomes part of the dancer. Dancers Recce Caldwell and Kyra Todd were 
encouraged to use what they could directly see, without over thinking the chance of what 
viscerally could become, nor analyzing it as nothing more than it is: 
Nicola Samorì’s relationship to the sources of his pictures is suffused with a continuous 
grappling with the history of visual art—not didactic, but substantive. His work as a 
painter and sculptor necessarily implies confrontation with this legacy, which nowadays 
is all too often regarded as unwieldy ballast. Samorì has no fear of the past or of his 
predecessors. He takes possession of them as role models and uses them to traverse the 
necessary path of knowledge and self-knowledge, using them as instruments to 
deconstruct their language and to found his own poetics. The suggestive power of an art-
historical icon can be so great that it is reworked again and again over the centuries; each 
work becomes a building block that gradually loses every component of recognizability, 
increasingly becomes one with its respective creator, and moves ever further away from 
the original work. (…) In the exhibition’s painterly works, Nicola Samorì works with the 
natural flaws in marble and onyx slabs, with cavities, geodes, and aggregates in the 
material. The figures in his pictures fit these flaws, rather than hiding them; sometimes 
these imperfections are repurposed as eyes, sometimes they dissolve into blossoms or 
faces, and sometimes they imitate nipples. The motifs develop out of a physical defect or 
deficiency and often point to the martyrdom of biblical or art-historical figures: Lucretia, 
St. Lucia, or St. Jerome. And when the raw material is flawless, as in the case of Santa 
Lucia in white Carrara marble, then it the artist who, with his processing, inserts a 
disruption or anomaly: as in a surgical intervention, he implants natural geodes in the 
material’s eye sockets. The act that blinds the picture opens the gaze of those who view 






I also purposefully selected these artworks because their mutilated, obscene compositions 
are not necessarily suggestive of any gender, race, class or culture. The depiction of a cranium 
also facilitates the understanding of why its separation from a body needs to be created 
accordingly and not systematically. If the body were present as part of these works, a mimetic 
disposition would draw fourth a narrative impulse abolishing the process leading into an 
emancipated state. Rather, these effigies ought to be seen as anamorphic and uninhibited. A 
mover is compelled when viewing these images, creating an emancipated experience from the 
guided language—monosyllabic terms in conjunction with neutral statements⸺that reflect a 
translation filtered through the images of these works. This, in turn, becomes a transformation by 
virtue of the applied disambiguation. Heidegger calls this Besinnlichkeit or contemplation or 
more appropriately reflective meditation, where the narrowing of ambiguity by embodying a 
unification of roles between the dancer, choreographer and spectator proves the primary 
objective stated at the beginning of this thesis; authentic movement is emancipated movement, 
just as much as emancipated movement is aesthetic movement. 
Jacque Rancière’s dissemination on The Intolerable Image creates the particular aesthetic 
that I describe as breaking the line, which is firstly a phenomenological and consciousness 
centered approach that transitions to a somatic-sensory and physically centered attempt. It 
focuses on movement that places the body in a vulnerable and uncomfortable performing state 
through the discovery of movement alternatives contrary to the typical contemporary dancer’s 
comfort zone. Comprising my choreographic signature is the explicit, contorted and anamorphic 
anatomical attempt used to create a transfigured image by essentially replacing the enjoyable and 
known with the intolerable and unknown. Simply put, the complete “opposite” is investigated 





vocabulary. Movement qualities comprising this aesthetic reflect the body’s grotesque and 
unpredictable nature when offered the power of chance through perceptibility. Essentially, by 
delineating a movement aesthetic of the intolerable image, one that in this case juxtaposes the 
conventional straight lines emphasizing the classical and contemporary repertoire, a dancer 
follows and embodies a list of neutral statements, monosyllabic terms and images to create an 
emancipated aesthetic of discovering what a specific intolerable image might feel or look 
like⸺the unlearning of the learned and the visceral manifestation of the becoming of the unseen 
and uncanny.  
It is without question that language facilitates a grounding that propels the intolerable 
aesthetic into visceral manifestation. The image of the effigy in each of the prompt charts averts 
the dancer’s temptation to willfully subscribe to fetishizing over a predetermined aesthetic that 
would be conveyed if the entire body was present. Shortly after the prompt charts are offered to 
the dancers, they are given eight minutes to memorize the chart containing the neutral 
statements, monosyllabic terms and an image in order to limit preempt narrative dependency. 
The eight-minute limit forces the dancer to engage only with what they observe on their prompt 
chart. The tripartite reasoning originates from the obvious fact that the dancer will likely be 
unable to fully memorize each of the neutral statements and monosyllabic terms. As a result, by 
virtue of the shortened nature (eight minutes) of cognitive stimulation upon observing the chart, 
the tripartite structure assumes that the dancer will select independent terms in the neutral 
statements without memorizing the entire neutral statement itself. The monosyllabic words are 
assumed to be memorized separately as well. The memorization of the images is a mere substrate 
neural imprint that translates into the becoming of a reactivation of the spectator’s own 





repetition implies that additional neural impulses to create alternative possibilities of movement 
creation will be halted.  
When the eight minutes come to an end, the idea of sharing equilibrium between the 
embodied roles of the choreographer, dancer and spectator remains residually active, rather than 
just momentarily active. Filming of the dancer starts the moment that the eight minutes of 
memorization come to an end, and the dancers are separated from each other in space. Dancer A 
will not view Dancer B, as the dancer as a spectator might have the tendency to convert 
visualized movement into mimicked movement, which goes against the scope of experiencing an 
emancipated state. Additionally, this approach abolishes the want of somatic repetition, 
suggestion and refinement that not only creates a narrative, but also places the body in an earlier 
realm, likely one that pursues the known rather than the unknown. The same approach is 
repeated with Dancer A. Finally, both dancers are reunited in the common space and are given a 
new “hybrid” prompt chart, which has a combination of neutral statements and monosyllabic 
terms that each dancer has discovered during their independent memorization and improvisation 
experiment. What differs slightly is the image’s non-representational aesthetic. Interestingly, the 
dancers now have a chance to view the previous terms that they embodied while separated from 
each other before proactively applying the rooted counterparts of language to proactively supply 
the condition of a shared aesthetic in space. Once again, the dancers are given eight minutes to 
memorize the prompt chart before experiencing sensory deprivation⸺they blindfolded 
themselves. This final scene includes both dancers filmed in complete silence, with no musical 
score reciprocating their visceral manifestation. The instructions below clarify the methodology 









Step 1: Dancer A and Dancer B are offered separate prompt charts that consist of 
different neutral statements, monosyllabic terms and an image. 
Step 2: Dancer A and Dancer B are given eight minutes to memorize as much as they can 
from the chart, considering the neutral statements, monosyllabic terms and an 
image essentially converted to neural reflections and later to movement impulses. 
Step 3.1: The same music score is given to both dancers. Dancer A leaves the performing 
area. Dancer B begins movement as soon as the music starts and the filming 
begins.  
Step 3.2 Dancer B leaves performing area. Dancer A begins movement as soon as the 
music starts and the filming begins.  
Step 4: Dancer A and Dancer B enter the performance area. Both dancers are given a new 
shared prompt chart with familiar neutral statements and monosyllabic terms. The 
image on this prompt chart differs from the chart that Dancer A and Dancer B 
viewed earlier. After eight minutes of memorizing the “hybrid” chart, both 
dancers experience sensory deprivation as they blindfold themselves and are 
placed somewhat equidistant from each other in the space. Both dancers begin to 
move, without a musical score accompanying the filming that captures them.  
 













Jagged right arm through palm Lob 
Left leg bent with curve and with flexed foot Jarred 
Back tilted with left knee caved in Taunt 
Neck bent with right shoulder raised Crack 
Left elbow elevated with left palm open Vaunt 

















Fig. 3. Image downloaded from a museum website 








Dancer B Final Independent Study Prompt Chart 
Neutral Statements Monosyllabic Terms 
Left ankle inverted with right knee bent Seal 
Torso tilted Stretch 
Neck bent back with arms curved Grip 
Right palm wrapped around left upper leg Loom 
Bent knees with arched back Gloom 

















Fig. 4. Image downloaded from a museum website 







Dancer A and B Final Shared Study Prompt Chart 
Neutral Statements Monosyllabic Terms 
Both feet and palms on floor Vaunt 
Head tilted and feet pointed Taunt 
Left arm straight Loom 
Legs crossed and arms crossed Gloom 
Head on floor with both legs extended Daunt 

















Fig. 5. Image downloaded from a museum website  








Additional Sample Prompt Chart for Dancers A and B used in Rehearsal for Experimentation  
Neutral Statements Monosyllabic Terms 
Right palm inverted Taunt 
Left leg bent with tilted torso Doom 
Left knee straight Gloom 
Left knee rotated with elbow curved Bloom 
 
Syntactical Deconstruction for content listed above:  
 
Taunt: Gibe - Middle French (gibber) “to handle roughly”; Doom: Proto 
Germanic (domaz) (source also of Old Saxon and Old Frisian [dom], Old Norse [domr]) 
“judgement,” “irrevocable destiny” to modern day “destruction”;Gloom: Dutch (gluren) “to 






















































1. Did you use the neutral statements and terms as a starting point or as a recurring motif 
throughout visceral manifestation?  
2. Did the depth of the music (audible frequency) in conjunction with the depth of the image 
offer you a heightened sense of perception that translated into experiencing a trance?  
3. How can the weighing of these specific monosyllabic terms (homonymic resemblances) 
present an accessible uncanny aesthetic in visceral manifestation differently than other 
common terms?  
4. How did you situate yourself in the space differently than if this methodology would not 












The diagram of the stages embodied (see Table 2) aims to simplify and clarify the 
ontological basis and existential relationship that it carries over how my theoretical framework 
successfully informs the dancing body. In accordance with Rancière’s work, found in Chapter 
four, The Intolerable Image, of the Emancipated Spectator, it is vital to understand that the mode 
of assessing his work provides a reasoning of translatability that the dancing body can directly 
embody (Rancière, Emancipated 83). Although Rancière explicitly postulates the embeddedness 
of the violence evocative through an emerging aesthetic when observing works of art, that is to 
say, the becoming of the unseen that translates into a transformation of more than what is merely 
seen, I have used his work as an ontological extension to clarify the notion of propelling a 





of “breaking the line,” a dancing body begins to sense lines that may have been previously 
hidden. “Breaking the line” is a trope that involves the equiprimordial shift needed to experience 
a distancing from what is known about pre-learned contemporary movement forms. As the shift 
continues, so does the dancer’s consciousness to engage with the material that was memorized 
from the prompt charts as a mindful, deterministic attempt to unlearn the learned in regard to 
movement vocabulary. Most importantly, these first two steps are completely self-driven and 
autonomous as they occur strictly in the phenomenological realm as indicated above. The 
following step examines the uncanny aesthetic as it reaches fruition through the bearing of the 
first two stages and (by its definition, mysterious and unknown) condenses the dancing body to 
embrace a non-representational mode of thinking. 
This mode is where the visceral manifestation surfaces as a direct investigation of the 
intolerable image, hence Rancière’s specific usage. The intolerable image, through both the 
textual and syntactical variances that it carries psychologically once observed visually and 
converted physically and through its procedural deliverance as with the case of this 
methodology, allows the dancer to strictly embody the discovery of what the intolerable image 
might look and feel like from its uncanny origin. How the dancer appropriates my methodology 
creates the outcome of what I describe as being an emancipated dancing body; the freedom of 
separation from the roles of the choreographer, dancer and spectator as well as the simultaneous 
embodiment of all these roles, or ontologically speaking, the unveiling of concealed 
convergences that inform the non-representational thinking required to successfully situate 
oneself in the trance of non-being. Heidegger would call this Anwesen or “a presence” within an 
essence. Additionally, Erklüftung (see Goulding, Daoist Phenomenology, Journal of Chinese 





by describing both interdependent realms that a dancing body would have to pass through into 
order to experience an emancipated state. Finally, Heidegger would also employ the term Ektasis 
(see Goulding, Visceral Manifestation, Beijing: Commercial publishers, 2003) or “the standing 
out but the standing out within” as an identical apparition that involves the notion of the dancing 
body as a vessel, that when experimenting with this methodology, dismantles the temporal-
spacio-horizon. The science fiction writer Phillip K. Dick insightfully denotes a similar 
perceptive epiphenomenon in what he dubs a “Ditheon dream”:  
. . . instead of a human mind crossbonding with the plasmate [human knowledge] to 
produce a homoplasmate, two human minds form the building blocks that compose the 
plasmate. This new life form has no body. Instead, “It utilizes the principle of 
organization to structure anything, a whole lot of things—ordinary things—into its 
“body.” Thus it is “floating” . . . It amounts to a “perturbation in the reality field,” 
exerting valence or displacement. To it, reality is a series of ideas, not things, since it 
itself is an idea (Dick 762). 
 
This crucial example reinforces the phenomenological principles that my methodology carries 
over the eventual emancipated experience sought after by dancing bodies investigating 
improvised movement. Referring to an earlier segment, the eight minutes of memorization prior 
to the visceral manifestation delivery also consider the accumulation of neural stimulation that 
causes fear [FÆRA] from Lt. [experior] defined as a person that has gone through a fearful time. 
This experience prepares and engages the simultaneity of all three converging and embodied 
roles to begin the stages of the methodology. This theoretical, cosmological methodology 
thereby deepens and solidifies the process used to enter improvised dance forms that a performer 
embodies by using philosophy, linguistics, phenomenology and aesthetics to inform, appropriate 
and reconfigure their intellect in order to convert, as Heidegger would have said, a “translation 





 It is also important to compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses that my 
methodology holds over the dancing body. Considering aspects of weakness, my methodology 
challenges the dancing body to accept the possibility of the body not dancing the dance, but 
rather the dance dancing the body. This ontological statement predicts the dancer’s ability to 
remain separate from and not authoritatively controlled by the codified languages often used and 
associated with roles in Western theatrical stage dance. My methodology allows a dancer to 
reteach themselves the other side of technique (intellectual counterparts) that has most likely 
been disregarded in a creative process. Philosophically speaking, the awareness that a dancing 
body experiences while improvising in a creative process is two-fold: firstly, it (the body) 
acknowledges its rigidity through its technical, anatomical training that allows the body to self-
identify as one that is capable of dancing, and secondly, the fundamental understanding that any 
or all dance that viscerally manifests is a product of partial chance and unpredictability just as 
much as it is partially predictable and calculated. This draws upon the notion of a dancer’s craft, 
which recognizes outcomes of both luck and skill. A skilled dancer can use luck to their 
advantage by making it seem as if both unpredictability (chance) and predictability (calculation) 
cleverly coalesce to cloak their desire of proving this methodology as being suitable or logical in 
achieving an emancipated state. This being said, chance in this case would work as an antagonist 
principle of visceral manifestation; that is to say, chance could both limit and inhibit a dancing 
body’s potential to experience an emancipated state based off of how technically skilled and 
anatomically adept it is. Chance, therefore, could be an outcome of using the mechanism of 
muscle memory to favour the skill that generates calculated chance, which is simply a matter and 





how phenomenology comes to inform the dancer-spectator at the time of visualizing the prompt 
chart.  
However, my methodology also contains aspects of strength that aim to challenge the 
dancing body by drawing upon an interdisciplinary method of self-application and devotion to 
fields of external thought such as phenomenology and aesthetics. These domains of thought, as 
my methodology explains, simply place the body in a realm outside of itself so that it may 
experience the “othering” of technique and anatomical customs gathered through years of 
training. In turn, the body that endures this method creates the uncanny dimension of aesthetics 
that craves exploration in order to project the dance that viscerally dances the body. The main 
strength that my methodology holds over a dancer is vivifying their volition to accept the margin 
of error that improvised dance forms wrongfully omit in terms of its arbitrary occurrence once 
practiced. My method acts as a starting point for a dancer to deepen their entry into the void of 
improvising, which itself implies that nothing has yet manifested for it to be traceable or 
configurable. It conditions the dancing body to level with often separated roles, dictating how an 
outcome should come to be in a practice where nothing should come to be in a certain way. By 
experiencing equilibrium between roles, my methodology naturally becomes part of the creative 
process outcome without disrupting the generic structure that many performers have accepted 
and become accustomed to employing. Rather, my methodology reinforces the way in which any 
mover, beginner or experienced, can enter into improvising deterministically. 
Many dance scholars, clinical psychologists, neurologists, performance philosophers and 
anthropologists have inspired the development of my methodology over the last few years. For 
example, James Leach and Catherine J. Stevens suggest in their 2020 work, “Relational 





incentive to generate creativity and common originality in shared interests among creative 
movers results in solos and duets that conveys a heightened sense of “interpersonal 
synchronization and joint action whose two settings support through distributed cognition has 
been explored experimentally” (Leach and Stevens 97). They go on to reference Edwin Hutchins 
from Distributed Cognition (2001): 
Hutchins theorizes that cognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a 
social group; the operation of the cognitive system involves coordination between 
internal and material/environmental structure; and products of earlier events can 
transform the nature of later events. Distributed processing occurs, he argues, when the 
processors are neurons, areas of brain, whole persons, groups of persons, or groups of 
groups of persons. He notes too that the cognitive properties of a group can differ from 
the cognitive properties of the members of a group. This is pertinent when considering 
human cognitive capabilities. The possibility of a creative outcome is made possible by 
group and distributed processes (Leach and Stevens 97). 
 
Hutchins’ notion on the neural-cognitive phenomenon of distributed processing shaped my work 
by offering me options for distributing my prompt charts in a manner that would limit the tracing 
of their own engrams or the neoplatonic notion of anamnesis. Moreover, Leach and Stevens’s 
research motivated me to use improvised dance as a means to resolve its inconsistency or 
deficiency, especially when examined in small numbers, hence my selection of a duet. What 
does it mean to feel improvised, especially if the dance that viscerally manifests dances the 
body? How can the now solidified version of improvised creative movement guide a dancer 
when practicing structured, narrative forms without falling back into the trap of codification?  
 Another source that shaped the development of my methodology is the work of Susanne 
Ravn whose analysis of Danish creative mover Kitt Johnson responds to “the enactive and 
phenomenological clarifications of agency—our capacity to perform acts, and how dancers then 
handle openness and spontaneity differently in improvisation practices” (Ravn 75). Ravn goes on 





Although it is essential to be aware of the spontaneity that characterizes improvisational 
practices, it can be argued, as I will elaborate in this article, that any enactment of a dance 
has an element of spontaneity. No dance can be an exact or full repetition of previous 
enactments. As any performance of a dance will entail unknown aspects—and some 
degree of openness—it will also demand some degree of spontaneity from the dancer. 
However, the next step is not to argue that, accordingly, we should simply dissolve 
conceptual barriers between improvised and non-improvised dances. Instead, I wish to 
emphasize that, by having accepted the potential openness and demand for spontaneity of 
any kind of dance practice, we should focus our investigations into improvisation on 
the ways openness and spontaneity are put to use or explored in enactments that 
specifically seek to experience and realize these aspects of the dance. In order to do so, I 
suggest, we need to turn our attention toward the way agency—a dancer's capacity to 
perform acts in a given context—is exercised by the dancer in the enactment of the dance 
(Ravn 75).  
 
Here, Ravn clearly differentiates between modes of improvising in movement; the agency that 
remains linear cause’s intentional improvisation to occur as well as the inability to entirely 
separate improvisation from the outcome of chance, which itself is a redistributed feature 
powering the agency that the dancer embodies. In my work, agency is examined by the mode of 
reasoning dancers choose to adopt in their creative process via the enframing that the prompt 
chart offers them. The tripartite structure (neutral statements, monosyllabic terms and artwork of 
effigy), in conjunction with the condensed time frame for memorizing, renews and revitalizes 
their agency over how they enter into improvised dance. With relation to this idea, Hubert L. 
Dreyfus discusses the following in his 2002 work, “Intelligence without Representation – 
Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to 
Scientific Explanation”:  
. . . two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be 
described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is 
expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the 
intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the 
tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, 
those skills are “stored”, not as representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond 
to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition 
confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer 





Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current 
situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require 
propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain 
representations either (Dreyfus 367). 
 
Dreyfus’s observations, paired with Ravn’s discussion on agency, helped me to understand how 
Merleau-Ponty’s topic on perception (specifically Merleau-Ponty’s earlier mentioning of “le 
corps propre” as a site of expression) might carry over to the eventual emancipation of the 
dancing body. Before employing hermeneutics, Dreyfus’ explanation utilizing both Merleau-
Ponty’s concepts on the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve maximal grip motivated my 
search for the monosyllabic terms that serve as one of three items in my prompt chart. I sought 
out these terms to create a neural pause for the dancer as they were not readily identifiable or 
feasible with situating in the realm of visceral manifestation. Considering the intentional arc, the 
selected monosyllabic terms in the prompt charts challenge the dancers alongside the suppression 
of time (the eight-minute memorization timeslot) mentally and physically by rivalling common 
terms that interconnect to experiences that have previously been stored and reused frequently. 
They act as the dispositions leading up to the situation of having to improvise. Moving to the 
notion of maximal grip, with merit to the image of the artwork in the prompt chart, it challenges 
the dancers semantically by juxtaposing what the gaze is often used to seeing and disregarding 
by replacing the gaze with the vision that exists in a deeper sense but has not yet been tamed for 
knowingness. In this case, my inspiration for selecting the terms and the images came with the 
goal of abolishing the sense of gestalt limitation by essentially reversing it; rather than a whole 
being perceived as larger than the sum of its parts, I ensured that the sum of a part constituting a 
whole remained more important as they delivered individual and independent considerations that 





 Lastly, in Ann Cooper Albright and David Gere’s book, Taken by Surprise: A Dance 
Improvisation Reader (2003), they account for the difference between choreographed movement 
and improvised movement by providing an elementalist differentiation between them. Albright 
and Gere claim that “perhaps choreography is like oil painting, and improvisation, more like 
watercolor where the immediacy of the mark, or gesture, is an important part of the poetics . . . 
where each new improvisation with its own carries a particular essence” (Albright and Gere 55). 
Their specific thoughts informed and inspired my work despite their elaborate use of examples 
throughout their own personal experiences in improvised dance, by proving to be mutually latent 
with my own research. On the one hand, my methodology silently exists in a concealed manner 
when a choreographer delineates fixed choreography to their dancers, but on the other, each 
body, regardless of the role that they embody at the time of the making and the becoming of the 
dance, has the option to experience the potential it has to offer. Discovering that the term 
presence has the word essence situated or rather (concealed) within it motivated my 
methodology to resonate the essence of an emancipated state with the presence of the dancing 
body being danced.  
 
Working around COVID-19 as an Advantage Shaping this Work 
 Through my creative process I aimed to enlighten and empower the performers’ 
experience while they embodied this sensitive methodology during a vulnerable time. This 
section highlights the importance of the simplistic editing approach that my video editor 
collaborator adopted. To create this work I used Zoom, a digitally interactive social platform for 





performance spaces. The dancers, Kyra and Reece, were given the opportunity to collaborate 
remotely without endangering their well-being or engaging in non-essential travel. 
Throughout the process, I encouraged the dancers to select micro-scale performing 
environments in their homes as extensions of the ideas investigated in Part I of my research, 
which emphasized the dancer’s role. In using informal performing spaces in their homes, the 
dancers could vivify their embodiment of my method without resorting to nostalgic, possibly 
inhibiting movement patterns previously associated and experienced with formal contemporary 
movement structures and performance settings. The performers were also granted the unique 
opportunity to sense the benefit of shifting their awareness in conjunction with my methodology 
once established in their selected performing spaces, offered them the ability to experience 
“movement newness” without implicitly using the methodology alone to co-create a similar 
understanding or passage that would resonate into the deeper contextual meaning that the 
methodology espouses.  
Kyra and Reece experimented with the elements of chance, desire, spontaneity and trust, 
which were all similar elements that many individuals needed to embrace during a relativity 
difficult time. Their internal presence as performers alongside their desire to manipulate the 
known with the unknown was documented for archival purposes by using a generally simplistic 
and uniform editing style (i.e., no special effects, creative editing, etc.). I also proposed the 
performers embrace their selected performance space without forcing themselves to drastically 
“improve” or “augment” their spaces in ways that suggest the exclusiveness of a professional 
formal studio or stage. As mentioned earlier in the examples of Acconci, the editing that I 
discussed with my collaborator is intended to absorb the overt spectator enjoyment driven 





rather than the reception of the work. In the end, both the process and the reception of my work 
were equally informative.  
 
Video Collaboration and Specificity of Contextualization 
The process that Peter Alcedo Jr. and I used as part of our collaboration for the final 
performance video began by discussing how we could use the performers’ remote locations and 
vivify them accordingly to suggest the philosophical depth that the overall research entails. By 
focusing on how the spectator’s reception of the video would be interpreted differently than if it 
was filmed in a formal performance setting such as a studio, along with live bodies in space, we 
realized that simplicity in this case would work to our advantage and serve my thesis’ largely 
procedural framework. The filming was completed in conjunction with Part IV of my thesis, as 
the prompt charts offered to the performers promised a deterministic outcome in visceral 
experimentation. In following the outline and instructions listed in Part IV, Kyra and Reece 
could use their understanding, and more importantly their instincts, on the recording day. This 
added to what the dancers described as being a heightened overall conceptual and intellectual 
experience. On the day we recorded the footage, both Kyra and Reece’s movement 
investigations were captured via Zoom and from a room of their choice with a neutral 
background, suggesting that the possibility of an early narrative would remain limited. The 
dancers wore simple black clothing and used basic warm soft-spot lighting to enhance their 
physical presence on screen and generate the aesthetic that they hoped to experience. The 
dancers applied light makeup as I encouraged the use of facial expressions as part of the overall 





After we finished recording, Peter and I compiled the main shots that consisted of 
approximately five minutes per dancer, to ensure that the former would be able to use the 
material without the tendency to manipulate them in excess of their cinematic counterparts. It 
was evident that this video would not be one where special effects would guide the spectator’s 
understanding with the hope of imprinting the element of entertainment as a main takeaway. 
Rather, the beauty of the minor edits that I suggested for the video editor’s creative integration 
would logically inform the overall uncanny aesthetic that any spectator could glimpse. The main 
shots consisted of performer A’s movement exploration, performer B’s movement exploration, 
performer A and B’s movement exploration and lastly, an additional capture of both performers 
static gaze, representational of the pensiveness used to assess and internalize the linguistic 
idiosyncrasies and visual art exposed on the shared prompt chart. This specific shot was where I 
encouraged the video editor to manipulate and invigorate it in such a way that would enthral 
viewers. The underlying metaphor was two-fold: the song’s title “come ruin and rapture” as an 
evocation of the “ruin and rapture” that the movement transitioned into from its origin when 
assessing language and visual art as co-constituent products. Finally, the music was 
professionally inserted on top of the individual shots to ensure that both artistic merit and 
spectator enjoyment would be adhered to evenly considering the track’s audible clarity. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, as a dancing body already exists as a political entity when entering a 
performing space, I was challenged to examine how I could support dancers to become 
autonomous through the methodology that I developed as part of my creative process informing 





assessing various segments and deconstructing works from the concomitance of the theorists and 
artists listed earlier in this thesis, the particular possibility of a “body phenomenology” begins to 
provide an access point for performers that will eventually transition into the emergence of an 
emancipating methodology exclusive to the deepening of and practice of improvised 
contemporary dance forms. Most importantly, by using hermeneutics, I have evaluated and 
analyzed these texts and works to propose a reconfiguration of their axiomatic counterparts that 
when attributed to the field of improvised contemporary dance, prove to be just as inseparable as 
the domain of performance philosophy.  
 The primary goal that I believe to have accomplished in my thesis includes the 
solidification of the initial subversive anomaly that the title of “improvised contemporary dance” 
calls for. Considering occidental thinking, generally, the term improvisation implies something 
that isn’t calculated and thereby carries the tendency to be criticized as lacking substance, 
structure or purpose. In Part I, I emphasized the role of the choreographer over the dancer, 
without entirely estranging the dancer’s role. Part II transitioned into emphasizing the role of the 
dancer and how codified languages from colliding roles dissipate upon demystifying three 
somatically compatible terms used to create the condition of a dance. Part II also deconstructed 
and recalibrated the meanings that those terms carry over the body from their German origins as 
identified in Heideggerian philosophy and examined how a body could internalize them 
proactively when converted into a hermeneutic phenomenological process. Part III emphasized 
the role of the spectator, primarily the value of their gaze, as supported by Jacques Lacan’s “The 
Split between the Eye and the Gaze” from book XI (1998) along with a few particular 
considerations central to the science of psychoacoustics that assesses music’s value. Finally, Part 





parts that delineated a process of emancipation that a dancing body may consult and proactively 
apply before, during and after the duration of a performance. Together, these four parts conjoin 
to create a process that could be used to challenge, inform and inspire the posterity of creative 
movers.  
 I believe that the statement that I mention several times throughout my thesis (authentic 
movement is emancipated movement, just as much as emancipated movement is aesthetic 
movement) can indeed be inserted logically into any creative process in order to deepen it by 
which a dancer enters improvised movement. I am not opposed to, nor am I rivalling, the 
conventional choreographer versus dancer versus spectator approach as it seems to be suitable 
considering the strict measures and etiquette that professional performers often adhere to in order 
to make a living in what they love the most. However, the scope of my thesis was to advocate for 
and acknowledge an alternative that challenges the possibility of creating an eventual levelling of 
roles that dismantles the social hegemony closely associated with the codified languages of roles 
affiliated within and around Western theatrical stage dance. By aiming to limit self-indulgence, 
ingratiation and egoism in improvised dance forms, drawing upon external fields such as 
political theory, phenomenology, philosophy and aesthetics may not seem as farfetched of a 













Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory. Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997. 
Adorno, Theodor W., and Frederic Will. The Jargon of Authenticity. Translated by Knut 
Tarnowski, Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
Albright, Ann Cooper, and David Gere. Taken by Surprise: A Dance Improvisation Reader. 
Wesleyan University Press, 2003. 
Badiou, Alain. Handbook of Inaesthetics. Translated by Alberto Toscano, Stanford University 
Press, 2005. 
Barthes, Roland. The Death of the Author. Translated by Richard Howard, UbuWeb Papers, 
1967, www.tbook.constantvzw.org/wp-content/death_authorbarthes.pdf.  
Bourguignon, Erika. “the relationship of trance and dance.” Trance, Dance and Ritual: Sacred 
Movements in the World’s Religions, 11 April 1995. Cambridge: Center for World 
Religions, Harvard University, 1995. 
Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018.  
Centers. Directed by Vito Acconci, Courtesy of Electronic Arts Intermix (EAI), New York, 
1971. 
Dreyfus, H. L. “Intelligence without Representation – Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental 
Representation The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific 
Explanation.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, 2002, pp. 367-83.    






Felluga, Dino. “Modules on Lacan: On the Gaze.” Introductory Guide to Critical Theory, 2002,  
http://www.purdue.edu/guidetotheory/psychoanalysis/lacangaze.html. 
Foley, Kathy. “The Dancer and the Danced: Trance Dance and Theatrical Performance.” Asian 
Theatre Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, 1985, pp. 28-49. 
Fraleigh, Sondra. “A Vulnerable Glance: Seeing Dance through Phenomenology.” Dance Research 
Journal, vol. 23, no. 1, 1991, pp. 11-16. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1478693.  
Gale, Matthew. “Elements of Chance.” Tate.org.uk, ADAGP, Paris and DACS, 2020, 
www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/display/elements-chance. 
 
Goulding, Jay. “Cheng and Gadamer: Daoist Phenomenology.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy,   
2021, pp. 1–15. 
Goulding, Jay. “‘Visceral Manifestation’ (藏象): Chinese Philosophy and Western 
Phenomenology (現象學).” Chinese Philosophy And The Trends Of The 21st Century 
Civilization, Edited by Fang Keli, vol. 4, 2003, pp. 360–417. 
Beijing: Commercial Publishers 
Hegel, Georg W. F. Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Translated by Bernard Bosanquet. 
Penguin Group, 1993. 
Jackson, Pamela, and Jonathan Lethem (eds). The Exegesis of Philip K. Dick. Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2011. 
Jensen, Marc G. “John Cage, Chance Operations, and the Chaos Game: Cage and the ‘I 
Ching.’” The Musical Times, vol. 150, no. 1907, 2009, pp. 97-102.  
Krauss, Rosalind. “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism.” October, vol. 1, 1976, pp. 50-64.   
Lacan, Jacques. “The Split between the Eye and the Gaze.”The Four Fundamental Concepts of 





Leach, James, and Catherine J. Stevens. “Relational Creativity and Improvisation in 
Contemporary Dance.” Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, vol. 45, no. 1, 2020, pp.95-
116. 
Leibniz G.W.“The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason.” Philosophical 
Papers and Letters. The New Synthese Historical Library (Texts and Studies in the 
History of Philosophy), Vol 2., edited by L. E. Loemker, Springer, 1989. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1426-7_67. 
Lepecki, André. Choreography as Apparatus of Capture. MIT Press, 2007. 
Lepecki, André. “Choreopolice and Choreopolitics: or, the task of the dancer.”TDR: The Drama 
Review, vol. 57, 2013, pp. 13-27.  
Mariño, Melanie. “Body as Place: Vito Acconci's Gaze.” PAJ: A Journal of Performance and 
Art, vol. 21, no. 1, 1999, pp. 63-74.   
Marks, Laura U. “The Haptic Critic 2.” The Journal of Images and Cultural, vol. 8, no. 1, 1995. 
Martin, Randy. “Between Intervention and Utopia: Dance Politics.” Emerging Bodies: The 
Performance of Worldmaking in Dance and Choreography, edited by Gabriele Klein and 
Sandra Noeth, Transcript Verlag, 2011, pp. 29-46. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1wxt9q.5.  
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Donald A. Landes, 
Routledge, 2012.   
Pallaro, Patrizia, editor. Authentic Movement: Essays by Mary Starks Whitehouse, Janet Adler 
and Joan Chodorow. Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1999. 
Rancière, Jacques. Dissensus on Politics and Aesthetics. Translated by Steven Corcoran, 





Rancière, Jacques. The Emancipated Spectator. Translated by Gregory Elliott, Verso, 2009. 
Rancière, Jacques. Figures of History.Translated by Julie Rose, John Wiley & Sons, 2014. 
Ravn, Susanne. “Investigating Dance Improvisation: From Spontaneity to Agency.” Dance 
Research Journal, vol. 52, no. 2, 2020, pp. 75-87.  
Scott, Maria. “Lacan's 'Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a' as Anamorphic Discourse.” Paragraph, vol. 
31, no. 3, 2008, pp. 327-43. 
Stefani, Chiara. See Into the Abyss. Excerpt, 2020. 
Taylor, Diana. The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas. 
Duke University Press, 2003. 
Taylor, Diana. “Translating Performance.” Profession, 2002, pp. 44–50. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/25595729.  
Theme Song. Directed by Vito Acconci, Museum of Modern Art, 1973. 
Wootton, David. “From Fortune to Feedback: Contingency and the Birth of Modern Political 
Science.” Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and the 
Unforeseen, edited by Ian Shapiro and SonuBedi, NYU Press, 2007, pp. 21-53. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qft23.4. 
 
 
